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Abstract 
The concept of variable wages is in many countries used as means of enhancing 
organisational efficiency and company performance. A production bonus is often set by the 
employer to influence and motivate the employee. Firms are dependent on employees to 
achieve the desired production outcomes. The cost of employees makes up the largest part 
of the total running costs of a business, and there is an increasing need to have flexible 
expenses in order to compete successfully in a fast growing and highly demanding market. 
In Norway, the use of variable wages is not very common compared to many other 
European countries. The importance of variable wage systems might be regarded as more 
relevant in some trades than others, for instance, when there is a need for individual 
decision making and creativity, motivating employees through the payment of a production 
bonus might be more applicable than paying a fixed salary. 
 
This thesis investigates the role of wage levels between output-related and non output-
related payment systems and discusses the individual characteristics of workers in output-
related occupations compared to non-output related occupations in the wholesale and retail 
trade, based on answering the following two research questions:  
 
1. “What is the effect of a bonus on wage levels?” 
2. “What are the individual characteristics of the recipients of bonus payments compared 
to non-bonus recipients?” 
 
The analysis takes a multidimensional view, as it looks at data at population, establishment 
and occupational levels.  
 
First, I investigate the effect of output-related pay systems on wage levels and compare the 
concept of variable wage with that of straight pay. Then, I investigate the individual 
characteristics of employees in output-related payment systems. Theories explaining the 
behaviour of participants in the employer-employee relationship and firms’ reasons for 
using variable pay schemes as well as previous research are drawn on to formulate and test 
a hypothesis. I use unique individual, occupational and establishment level data from the 
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Norwegian wholesale and retail industries for the years 1983 to 1996, which had more than 
245 000 employees in more than 30 000 establishments. 
 
This thesis focus on four expressions of hourly wages. These are defined as: (1) straight 
salary, which is fixed pay and exclusive to non-output related payment systems; (2) base 
wage, which is the fixed component of compensation paid to individuals who also receive 
a bonus component; (3) bonus, which refers to the variable pay component used in output-
related pay systems; level of bonus is often directly related to performance; (4) base wage 
plus bonus, which is the total wage paid to employees in output-related pay systems. The 
wage component (2, 3 and 4) is thus exclusive to output-related payment systems, while 
straight salary (1) is exclusive to non-output payment systems. 
 
From the investigations done in this thesis, there is support for that the size of the variable 
wage is large enough to make up a substantial part of a firm’s variable expenses. The effect 
of variable wages, and in particularly the bonus wage component, varies according to 
gender, trade, region and size of firm. Finally, the flow of information in the employer-
employee relationship and policy making seem to be important in arriving at the decision 
to use a variable wage system compared to paying a straight salary.
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1 Introduction 
Output-related payment systems - such as commissions and piece rates - are 
common in many jobs. Their central feature is that the wage of an employee is 
tied directly to her current performance.  
(Petersen, 1992a:67) 
 
Historically, output-related payment systems are connected with sales commissions and 
variable pay based on reaching fixed production targets. The key issue of output-related 
systems versus non-output related systems is the ability to motivate. According to the 
Oxford Latin Dictionary, the word motivation stems from Latin “motivus” and means “to 
start movement” (Glare, 2000). Many modern organisations are making variable 
compensation a significant percentage of employee compensation in the form of profit 
sharing, bonuses and stock options. “Variable pay” can be defined as employee 
compensation that changes compared to “fixed salary”, which is most often paid in 
monthly equal proportions throughout the year. The idea is that when the company is 
successful, the employees also prosper. It is, however, unclear to what extent a variable 
wage motivates the individual or if the variable pay has other purposes, such as providing 
financial flexibility for the firm. 
 
The term “variable pay” is a very broad one, and its definition is not always clear. For the 
purpose of this thesis, variable pay differs from “fixed pay”, in which that the latter form of 
remuneration is agreed to in advance. Variable pay implies an element of uncertainty both 
for the employer and the employee. Uncertainty is created in respect of both individual and 
collective performance, which is measured on the basis of the output by individual 
employees, by teams or by firms.  
 
Variable pay is used generally to recognise and motivate employee contribution towards 
increased company productivity, profitability, team-work, safety, quality or any other 
metric deemed important. Thus, variable pay can be regarded as an incentive contract with 
the purpose to align the individual’s preferences more with the preferences of the owners; 
this tenet is also known as “Principal-Agent” situation. Economic incentives which aim to 
stimulate employee effort and enhance firm output are under some circumstances referred 
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to as the “technical-economical” system. The technical-economical system can be traced 
back to the “scientific management” (Taylor, 1911) proposed by Fredrick Taylor who 
designed a system based on increasing individual performance. Reactions to his system 
were strong. Subsequently, the human resource movement emphasised the importance of 
individual interest beyond means of production (Silverman, 1970). There has also been 
carried out studies in Norway on how the technical-economical system can be viewed from 
the perspectives of the employee. One such study is Lysgaards (1985) theory of the 
arbeiderkollektivet (translated into “community of employees”, for the purpose of this 
thesis), who refers to an informal system of norms which sets boundaries for employee 
behaviour. The employees act and behave based on a “collective understanding” of their 
situation. This collective understanding of the employees might have some undesirable 
characteristics for the employer. One such undesirable characteristic might be to work at a 
pace slower than what the employers feel is in the best interest of the firm. For the 
employer to motivate or change the collective employee understanding, motivations can be 
provided by variable wages.  
 
In this chapter I will first give a brief introduction of bonus as a variable wage component, 
look at some recent concerns in the media of bonus and give and introduction to what 
economic factors that might cause changes to wage components. Then, I will introduce the 
wholesale and retail trade, in which my research was performed. Finally, I will introduce 
the research questions of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Introducing bonus as a variable pay component 
The use of the bonus seems to be increasing in Norway (Lunde & Grini, 2007), signifying 
the growing importance of variable wages. There are potential implications for policy 
making, in terms of salary negotiations and relations with trade unions. One immediate 
question that arises is this: is the bargaining power of labour unions affected when wages 
are variable? There is some fear that unions would no longer be needed and might 
disappear if the trend to variable wages continues.1 
                                                 
1 Jorun Berland, chair of the Finance Sector Union, had the following to say on the issue of development 
patterns in variable wages in an interview with a Norwegian newspaper: “The changes in the Norwegian 
labour markets’ payment structures are so extensive that the Finance Sector Union of Norway fears to be 
erased within 10-15 years if the trend continues” (Aftenposten, February 2nd, 2008). 
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In this thesis, special emphasis has been placed on contrasting the straight salary with the 
base wage plus bonus. In the latter case, the base wage is usually a higher proportion of the 
total remuneration than the bonus. Nevertheless, the bonus is often a significant proportion 
of the total remuneration. Here, I will treat the use of the bonus as an incentive mechanism 
for employees and as an opportunity for financial flexibility for employers. Social 
scientists have studied such payment structures for many decades (Pearson, 1960; Spence 
& Zeckhauser, 1971; Blakemore, Low & Ormiston, 1987; Petersen, 1992b, to name a few). 
In this section I will take a closer look at concerns for having variable wage systems. But 
first, I will provide a thorough explanation of the bonus and explain why there are some 
concerns about its wide use in supplementing regular payments. 
 
Bonus 
This thesis will consider the bonus as a variable pay component in the wholesale and retail 
trade, and investigate what effects, compared with a straight salary, this form of 
compensation might have on the distribution of wages. Only a bonus paid as money will be 
taken into account; other benefits, such as free phone, car, stocks, options, etc., are not 
included. Further, it is not possible to distinguish between different types of bonus – for 
instance, that paid according to number of sales, or paid quarterly or once a year – because 
of the way the data is reported by Statistics Norway (SSB); the total amount of bonus pay 
per person is reported to the SSB once a year, and is reported in the data as 1/12 of the 
yearly sum each individual received. This means that, even though the term bonus may be 
used under different circumstances and may refer to several elements of the payment 
system (i.e. sales commission, profit sharing), there is no such differentiation in the way 
the bonus is reported in these data. 
 
A bonus is often based on one of the following (Lunde & Grini, 2007:7): 
 Profit sharing 
 Individual or team-based arrangements 
 Combined agreements, by which the employee shares in profit on the basis of 
how well the company is doing. 
 
While the base wage can be compared to a straight salary, a bonus differs in several ways. 
One difference is that a bonus is not necessarily contractually agreed upon prior to the 
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outcome. A straight salary, on the other hand, is normally agreed upon in a contract that is 
signed before the employee starts his or her work.  
 
Another apparent difference is that a straight salary is paid regardless of effort and results. 
The whole idea of a bonus can, however, be said to be to reward employees for work done 
exceeding what would “normally” be expected of them to do. If the employee was not 
expected to perform above the level of what could be regarded as normal, a straight salary 
would be more suitable for the type of occupation in question. 
 
A third difference is that the straight salary and the base wage are heavily influenced by the 
national actors in the labour market, i.e. unions and other types of employee organisation. 
The terms of bonus is also often set by the national actors, but the actual size received by 
the individual might vary according to number of sales or other criteria set by the firm. 
 
A fourth difference is that a bonus normally does not bind the firm financially if certain 
conditions are not met. The conditions the employee has to fulfil will almost always result 
in a higher profit to the firm, assuming the employers develop contracts that are in their 
interest. If these conditions are not met, the firm has no responsibility to pay the variable 
part of the wage to the employee.  
 
A fifth difference can be found between bonus and ordinary wage in the wage 
development. If, for instance, a five percent raise is agreed upon one year, it is seldom an 
option to cut wages by five percent the following year, since the contract is normally fixed. 
This is, however, normally quite the opposite situation with a bonus, as the idea itself is 
normally to avoid obligating the employers to the same extent as a straight salary does. As 
the bonus wage component does not legally bind the employers to the same extent, a bonus 
provides a firm with financial flexibility.  
 
Concerns regarding bonus 
In this section I will look at some of the issues raised in recent media debates regarding the 
use of bonuses. 
 
The topic of bonus is subject to much debate in the media: One of the main concerns is that 
a variable wage, and in particular a bonus wage component, is believed to serve the 
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purposes of the firm and not the individual employees’ welfare. “A bonus is not rational as 
a wage component as it has the effect of working against what is in the best interest of the 
employee”.2 When the economy is booming, it will be easy to receive a bonus based on 
sales commissions as there will be more buyers in the market. When the economy has 
reached its climax and starts to cool down, however, customers are likely to disappear, as 
does the bonus. Therefore, a bonus can be viewed as enforcing an accommodation of 
changing economic circumstances. When times are good, a bonus enforces an increase in 
the buying power of the individual employee, and a decrease in individual buying power 
when times are poor, while a straight salary is less likely to have either of those effects. A 
recent interview in a newspaper concluded; “Bonus is like fudge. It tastes sweet, but does 
not last very long”.3 
 
A bonus is also associated with risk, with the risk aspect connected to information 
principles. When receiving a straight salary, one knows when to expect the salary and how 
much salary to expect. In the case of a bonus, the individual neither knows when to expect 
it, nor how much he or she is to receive. This saying presupposes that the employee does 
not have a fixed agreement on how much bonus to receive. When facing the choice of two 
contracts, one with a fixed salary and the other with a variable wage, which in many cases 
will appear to give a higher pay, many will be tempted by the bonuses.  
 
Why do pay structures change? 
Towards the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, there were changes in the world 
economy due to economical instability. This is referred to as the bank crisis and also had a 
large impact on the Norwegian economy. When such impacts are had on the general 
economy there are large consequences for companies within all sectors. Companies are 
forced to adapt and make changes to their structure in order to successfully face a new 
environment. Norwegian structural changes to organisational forms are well documented, 
especially for the banking sector (OECD, 1992; Olberg, 1995). Even though economic 
stress is not desirable for any country, structural changes are bound to happen and make for 
a very interesting situation suitable for researching changes to labour markets. One 
important part of such changes is payment structures. In this thesis I will take a closer look 
                                                 
2 Interview with Bjørn Helge Gundersen, Managing Director of AFF, Dagens Næringsliv 08.04.2008 
3 Interview with Jorunn Berland, Chair of the Finance Sector Union of Norway, Aftenposten 25.03.2007.  
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at payment systems in the period from 1983 to 1996 and I will discuss the political 
framework concerning wage formations for the period in question. More specifically, I will 
investigate the distribution and effect of the variable wage component, the bonus. 
 
Employers use the bonus as a motivational factor to raise employee productivity. In 
addition, employers have more flexibility with firm’s equity in the case of changing market 
conditions as wages are variable. Hence employers would, in theory, always prefer to pay a 
bonus over a fixed pay increase. The general idea of variable wages is that the employee 
will perform better and become more loyal as there is motivation to perform the job above 
what is expected when being paid in a non-output related pay system. Another idea is that 
the level of pay in a variable wages system should be higher than in a straight salary 
system as there are more risks involved in the variable nature of the pay. Petersen and 
Snartland (2004) note:  
 
With respect to wages, it is thus thought that workers paid according to output 
related wage systems on average are given extra compensation in part for 
working harder and in part for the additional risks they face.   
      (Petersen & Snartland, 2004:254) 
 
The worker is also less likely to change jobs when wages are higher, in a given firm. This 
again lowers cost to employers when considering the cost of hiring and training. There are, 
however, important aspects to consider on the employee side of the effect of a bonus: First, 
a bonus is not a reliable source of income. A bonus does not only depend on the 
employee’s own effort, but also that of his co-workers, and on his managers, the general 
economy and random events. Second, a bonus might raise an employee’s motivation in one 
round, but be de-motivating in the next. It does not necessarily motivate the employee to 
work hard, or to achieve the goals that qualify him or her for a bonus, when coming to 
realise that the current year’s extra effort was all for nothing. There is no guarantee the 
company will have a surplus to distribute among the employees. For example, the risk of 
production faults could be ascribed to the worker, which means less risk to the company 
owners. When a company is not able to motivate its employees in the long run, or random 
factors such as changing market conditions prevents the company from reaching the 
desired surplus, employees might get fired or be forced to look for new employers. Third, 
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when a bonus is received over a longer time period, the employee will automatically start 
relying on it as a source of income in the same way as they do on fixed pay. In the worst-
case scenario, this might result in personal bankruptcy if bonus payments should suddenly 
cease. Currently4, the world economy is threatened by going into recession. If there is a 
crisis in the global economy, it is not unlikely that even Norwegian companies will have to 
cut costs. And where will they start? By cutting variable pay5: 
 
Undoubtedly there were a lot of disappointed workers at mid-year bonus time 
this summer. Companies that are tightening their belts for the first time in 
years are finding their variable pay plans put to the test. (...) During the recent 
boom times, variable pay awards and stock options with value have been 
treated like entitlements  (Frase-Blunt, 2001). 
 
In Section 1.2, I will give a short introduction to the wholesale and retail trade. The 
definitions of the wholesale and retail trade will be given in order to make differences 
between them clear. Then an elaboration of the development of in wholesale and retail is 
provided. Finally, indications of the rate of unionisation and tariff agreements in the 
private sector are briefly elaborated on. 
 
1.2 The wholesale and retail trade 
Wholesale means selling goods to other businesses, for example, sales via commission to 
franchises such as grocery stores, farms, industrial firms, construction firms, etc., which 
use goods for commercial purposes (SSB, 2007).  
 
The definition of wholesale is much wider than the one for retail. Wholesale 
includes delivery of merchandise to industries as building & construction, 
hotels & restaurants, private & business services and public sector. One 
                                                 
4 2007/2008 
5 In Norway, lowering wages is normally not an option due to union regulations ensuring employee security. 
What is done instead is letting employees go. However, a bonus is not as easily regulated by legislation since 
a bonus is a variable pay component and more often viewed upon as an entitlement and not a legal right.  
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common description of wholesale is that wholesale is aimed towards other 
businesses and not private consumers, as is the case in retail (Olberg & 
Jordfald, 2000:42). 
 
Retail is defined as enterprises selling new and used goods in the enterprise’s own name 
and at its own cost, from a fixed location or a regular shop. The goods are usually so-called 
“fast moving consumer goods” (FMCGs). Examples of FMCGs are electronic, clothing, 
furniture and grocery stores (SSB, 2007). 
 
The wholesale and retail trades are a significant part of Norway’s economy. From1970 to 
1995 the number of employees in the wholesale and retail industry has more than doubled.6 
Wages have grown more compared with the rise in prices on FMCGs7, thus allowing each 
person to consume more than previously. As demand for FMCGs is increasing, the 
wholesale and retail trade have a unique position of development: Through global 
networks, firms are able to export and import goods more cheaply and more efficiently. 
Goods move more easily across boarders, partly as a result of the European Economic 
Arena (EEA) agreement in collaboration with the European Union (EU). As merchandise 
becomes more available, and each person consumes more of it, the position of a few 
corporations becomes stronger as they control a large share of the market. In Norway, four 
corporations have between them over 80 percent of the market share8 in retail. 
 
Unionization and tariff coverage in the wholesale and retail trade 
The number of employees organised in unions is lower in the private sector than the public 
sector. In 1998, 43% of the employees in the private sector were organised in unions 
(Olberg & Jordfald, 2000). The degree of organisation is even lower in the wholesale and 
retail trades than the mean rate of unionisation in the private sector. In 1998, 20% of 
employees in wholesale and 25% of employees in retail said they were organised in a 
union (Neergard, 1998). From 1983 to 1997, the unionisation rate rose by about 7% in 
                                                 
6 Number of employees: National accounts figures, 1996 from Statistics Norway (SSB). 
7 A recent survey shows that wages increased more than prices for merchandise and services (Dine Penger, 
No.8, 2008)  
8 The companies are (percent of market share in brackets): The Norges Group (28.4%), The Haakon Group 
(21.9%), Forbrukersamvirket (Cooperative Society) (21.3%), Rema (10.6%). 
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Norway, which is high compared to the rate of employment for the same period (Andresen, 
1997). 
 
“Within the different industries, it is in wholesale where we find the lowest amount of tariff 
agreements. In retail, on the other hand, 63% of the employees said their wages were 
negotiated in a tariff agreement” (Olberg & Jordfald, 2000:66). An investigation of the use 
of tariff agreements shows that there are more people employed under such agreements 
than the number of employees organised in unions, with 60% in retail and 40% in 
wholesale perceiving themselves to be covered by tariff agreements in 1998 (Olberg & 
Jordfald, 2000:67). There is, however, uncertainty concerning the amount of employees 
covered by the tariff agreements, which might vary due to several factors. One factor is 
that employees might believe they are covered by a tariff agreement while they are really 
not. The coverage of tariff agreements is often based on questionnaires asking employees 
how they perceive wages to be set. On the other hand, the importance of tariff agreements 
might be greater than first assumed: employers in organisations which are normally not 
covered by tariff agreements might use tariff agreements in an informal way to set wage 
levels for their firm. I base my understanding of the degree of organisation in the wholesale 
and retail trade on Olberg and Jordfald (2000) and Neergaard (1998). Those investigations 
are based on material from the workforce investigation (in Norwegian: 
Arbeidskraftsundersøkelsen), which uses a questionnaire asking respondents to indicate 
how they perceive wages are set for them.  
 
In the wholesale and retail trade, there is likely to be a lower amount of unionisation 
compared to many other industries. There are, however, many employees who are covered 
by tariff agreements. When it comes to wage bargaining structure, I will treat this 
separately in Chapter Two. 
 
1.3 Research questions and objective  
The objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between output-related payment 
systems and wage levels, and discover the individual characteristics of workers in output-
related occupations. In order to achieve this, two broad themes or research questions are in 
focus:  
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1. “What is the effect of a bonus on wage levels?” 
2. “What are the individual characteristics of the recipients of bonus payments compared 
to non-bonus recipients?” 
 
First, I will investigate the effect of paying a bonus on wage levels. Do employees paid 
under output-related payment systems receive higher hourly mean wages? In pursuing this 
research question, I take an employee perspective and look at whether bonus systems are 
more profitable for the employee than straight salary. I must assume that this payment 
system is in essence more profitable for the employer, as the employer offers the 
agreement in the first place.9 I emphasise objective factors related to risk. It is important to 
address the risk employee face when rewarded under such output-based systems. But it is 
also important to keep in mind that I am here not able to look at any factors related to the 
individual, except from the descriptive statistics I have on wage components. In other 
words, I am not able to say anything concerning preferences or feelings the individual 
might have towards such systems. When drawing on the existing literature and considering 
employee distribution and wage gains made under variable wage systems compared to 
straight salary, this might provide some insight into what the benefits from such systems 
might be. Second, I investigate differences between bonus receivers and non-bonus 
receivers in terms of their characteristics, such as gender, and of structural identifications, 
such as demographic features, size of firm and trade.  
 
Introduction to research design 
The first two research questions are clearly of a descriptive nature, indicated by the use of 
“what” (as opposed to a more explorative “how”; see, for example, Yin, 1984). I do, in 
other words, expect a bonus to have a different impact on wage levels than straight salary. 
The research design will be descriptive, taking a quantitative approach in the analysis. 
Addressing the first question will give us a general impression of the usefulness of a bonus, 
whereas addressing the second question will increase our understanding of the 
characteristics of variable pay systems where a bonus is used.  
 
                                                 
9 Here, we assume the employer is "rational" and acting as an "economic man" as described by for instance 
by John Stuart Mill in 1874. 
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Relevancy of the research questions 
The research questions or themes are relevant and interesting because they create 
awareness of flexible wage formations. Are wages becoming more variable? Can variable 
wages increase a firm’s flexibility, and if so, have there been any changes throughout the 
years investigated in this thesis? Second, the research questions shed light on the 
organisation of employees and their pay formations. In recent debates in the media there 
has been a focus on the development of variable wages and how an increase in bonus 
payments might lead to changes in, for instance, rates of unionisation. Here, we investigate 
what the effect a bonus have on wage levels and compare this to the wage level for straight 
salary and how the effect can be different for various characteristics, as for example 
gender. In addition, we look at why it may be necessary for some firms to be able to 
reward differently (i.e. why it is sufficient in some firms to have a straight salary, while 
others are better of paying a variable wage). 
 
This thesis contributes to exciting knowledge by using unique data providing extensive 
information regarding the wholesale and retail trade which has never before been used. The 
analysis of the data will be discussed in light of a theoretical framework which, to the best 
of my knowledge, has not been used for the purpose of investigating variable wages in the 
wholesale and retail trade in Norway.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The remainders of the thesis are organised as follows: Chapter Two lays the groundwork 
for the empirical study by setting out the theoretical and empirical frameworks and 
developing hypotheses based on this. Chapter Three presents the methodology adopted in 
this study and the data set analysed in the thesis. Chapter Four presents the results of the 
data analysis, while Chapter Five discusses the results in light of the theoretical and 
empirical frameworks and the research questions. Chapter Six presents the conclusions 
reached, drawing out the policy implications, and makes suggestions for future research.  
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2 Theoretical and empirical frameworks 
In this chapter, the theoretical and empirical frameworks of the thesis will be outlined. Two 
main theoretical perspectives are presented: the Principal-Agent theory and the theory of 
flexible firms, with the focus on the financial flexibility of firms. In addition to these two 
theories, I will also emphasise some theoretical viewpoints from theories of innovation and 
entrepreneurship, as such theories might help us to better understand the differences 
between motivational factors for given pay systems in various firms.  
 
With regards to the Principal-Agent theory, the focus will be on the work of Petersen 
(1993a). With regards to the theory of the flexible firm, I will elaborate on Atkinson’s 
(1984) framework. When looking at the issue of financial flexibility in previous research in 
the case of Norway, I will highlight the theoretical perspectives adopted by studies of the 
Norwegian labour market, mainly those by Olberg (1990, 1995) and Langeland (1995, 
1999). 
 
2.1 Principal – Agent theory 
In this section, an overview of the Principal-Agent theory will be given. First I give a 
description of the theory and its main components. Then I explain why the theory is 
important to this thesis and finally discuss how the theory can be applied in the labour 
market.  
 
Hypothesis used in the analysis are derived based on the theoretical and empirical 
framework, and will be mentioned in context of the frame work. 
 
In the employer-employee relationship, the principal is usually the employer and the agent 
is the employee. The challenge of the principal is to design a contract that maximises the 
principal’s use of the surplus when the contract is completed. One way of maximising the 
use of the surplus is for the principal to ensure that he benefits from the work done by the 
agent. This means that the agent is able to receive an in advance agreed upon level of the 
surplus of his work. The principal, however, also receives a share of the agent’s work. This 
requires that the work done by the agent is observable by the principal. If the work or 
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achievement of the work is not observable it can not be contracted for (Bragelien, 2001). 
Petersen (1993a) defines Principal-Agent relationships as follows: 
 
…a Principal-Agent relationship arises when a principal contracts with an 
agent to perform some tasks on behalf of the principal. In executing the tasks, 
the agent chooses an action. The action, in turn, has certain consequences that 
are an outcome, and the outcome affects the welfare of both the principal and 
the agent (Petersen, 1993a:277). 
 
The use of Principal-Agent theory can be traced back to the 1930s. Berle and Means 
(1932) and Coase (1937) can be viewed as pioneers in agency theory. The theory was 
put forward to explain dilemmas that could appear in contractual behaviour between 
two parties, i.e. the principal and the agent. Many of the research questions relating 
to the Principal-Agent theory are concerned with how individuals interact with 
organisations in some form or other. Principal-Agent theory can be placed within the 
tradition of rational choice (Collins, 1994:121-181). However, placing the Principal-
Agent model under circumstances of strict rationality should be done carefully. For 
the purpose of this thesis, I extend my understanding of the Principal-Agent model 
and look at circumstances where neither the principal nor the agent act solely based 
on the neoclassical economic understanding of rationality.  
 
Early work on proving empirical significance of the Principal-Agent theory was done 
on insurance contracts. Insurance contracts provided empirical data regarding the 
contractual pay-off between a principal and an agent, or in the case of insurance 
contracts between the insurance company and the individual buying insurance 
(Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). Later, Principal-Agent theory was found 
to be very useful in explaining employment contracts in terms of how an employer 
(principal) can motivate an employee (agent) by applying different criteria for 
awarding wage components. Theoretical implications of Principal-Agent theory are 
still being researched and developed (see, for example, Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  
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Why is the Principal-Agent theory of interest to this thesis? 
The theory is particularly interesting because it describes the incomplete or asymmetrical 
information that might arise – and are found in most – employer-employee relationships. 
The aspect of incomplete information suggests a problem for the employer, a problem that 
might be overcome by providing appropriate motivation for the employee to perform work 
following the employer’s criteria. Arguably, it is in the absence of strong formal 
requirements employees will follow an informal systems, based on a set of norms 
developed by the “community of employees” (Lysgaard, 1985). This may be a problem to 
the employer if these norms do not match the employer’s definition of what is in the best 
interest of the firm. It is therefore desirable for the employer to have information on the 
performance of each employee in order to ensure that they do what is desired by the 
employer. However, to have extensive information regarding an employee’s performance 
may be impossible.  
 
The wholesale and retail trade seem to be ones where there is a relatively high level of 
variable wage receivers. I assume from the definition of wholesale and retail that there is a 
need to motivate employees who work in occupations with a strong focus on selling. Sales 
are likely to create competition among firms, with the competitive element largely 
motivated by which firm of all those competing for sales makes a profit from sales. 
Therefore it will also be necessary for a company to recruit motivated sales staff and use 
economical means of motivating them to achieve desirable sales targets. It is the economic 
motivation created by variable wages which is of interest in this thesis.  
 
The Model 
There are five central elements describing the Principal-Agent model: (1) Type of agent, 
(2) Agents self-interest, (3) Random factors, (4) Outcome and (5) Asymmetrical 
information. Regarding asymmetrical information, I discuss central elements of 
information where asymmetrical information is the main category and moral hazard and 
free-riders are sub-categories for explaining the information problem. These five elements  
will be presented next. 
 16
Type of agent 
The type of agent may vary. Type may refer to personality or individual characteristics of 
the agent. The agent may be careful vs. careless, trustworthy vs. untrustworthy, completing 
tasks fast vs. working slowly, reliable vs. unreliable and so forth. For instance, when 
visiting a dealership for cars (agent), the customer (principal) would like the dealership to 
be both reliable and trustworthy. One will expect the right amount of service and reliability 
about one’s purchase. If the dealership does not appear to be trustworthy, the principal 
might look for a different agent. Similar situations arise in many other Principal-Agent 
relationships, for instance, doctor-patient, teacher-student, entrepreneur-investor. A person 
may be a principal in one situation and an agent in another. In many cases, what might 
influence the choice of the principal could be recommendations or personal references. 
 
Agent’s self-interest 
Individual preferences of the agent might influence the outcome of the situation. 
 
An incentive structure such as splitting the surplus and ownership among 
employees is expected to lead to a rise in productivity and identification with the 
firm on the employee side (Langeland 1999:121). 
 
Individual preferences can be what make the agent decide on his or her own level of effort 
in a situation. The level of desired effort is often contractually agreed to in advance, by the 
principal and the agent. Normally, the principal lays down the terms or conditions for the 
agent, as the principal is the contractor. However, after the contractual agreement has been 
made, it is hard for the principal to measure anything but the outcome. For this reason, the 
agent may choose less effort than first agreed to in the contract. The rationality behind this, 
for instance in an employer-employee relationship, is that it will be costly for the agent to 
exercise more effort than necessary. Therefore the agent needs the right motivation in order 
to bring the interests of employer and employee closer together.  
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Random factors 
Random factors might affect the outcome of any situation. Such factors are beyond the 
control of principal and agent. For instance, the sale of ice cream might change due to 
weather conditions. During warm summers, more people will buy ice cream, while during 
cold and dark winters, there are fewer people buying ice cream. Ice cream sales will also 
depend on the effort of the seller: the design of an advertisement and his reputation might 
determine the trustworthiness of the seller, as well as the quality of the product, and its 
supply and demand in the market. In particular in the case of consumer products that are 
not essential (for instance, television sets and computers versus milk and bread), random 
factors might have a large impact on sales. 
 
When there are random factors involved, there is also a greater risk for the agent. The 
agent should be rewarded for taking risk. If the agent were not rewarded for extra risk, 
there would be no need for a variable wage component, and straight salary would be better 
for the agent. If base wage plus bonus is lower than straight salary, base wage plus bonus 
only benefits the employer. This proposition leads me to investigate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Employees who receive a base wage plus bonus have higher hourly 
pay than employees on straight salary. 
 
Outcome 
Outcome is the result of individual characteristics, individual preferences and random 
events. The outcome, or the results created by the agent, is usually observable to both the 
principal and the agent, and it is measurable. Examples of observable outcome can be 
number of sales made by a salesperson, amount of fish caught, number of patients visited 
and so forth. In other words, both quality and quantity can be measured to some extent. 
However, quantity can be viewed as the easiest part to measure. When the principal wants 
to ensure quality in the work, there are several difficulties of observation. And these 
difficulties are often based on information. 
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In Figure 2.1, the Principal-Agent model is shown. “P” symbolises the principal and “A” 
symbolises the agent. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Principal-Agent model10 
 
 
 
Information 
Information is crucial for understanding the decision-making process of employers and 
employees. Based on the available information, principal and agent can decide whether 
they wish to engage in the employer-employee relationship. The information problem 
relates to studies in transactions (i.e. wage) where one party has more or better information 
than the other.  
 
One of the main challenges for the Principal-Agent theory is control over information, 
more specifically, the principal’s ability to monitor the effort of the agent between the 
point at which the contractual relation is determined and the point at which the outcome 
has become observable. Here, I will discuss some of the information problems and possible 
                                                 
10 Figure from wikipedia.org. Based on the agency theory of Principal-Agent realationships. 
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ways of overcoming them. First, I introduce the information problem in a general sense, 
and then I focus on three aspects of the information problem; asymmetrical information, 
moral hazard and the free rider problem. Asymmetrical information addresses the general 
problem of information in the Principal-Agent relationship. Moral hazard describes an 
aspect of asymmetrical information which might be encountered if the employee’s morals 
are low. I will here look at moral hazard as a problem encountered under individual 
Principal-Agent relations. Individual Principal-Agent relations is in contrast to “group 
schemes”. The free rider problem describes a second aspect of asymmetrical information 
that might occur when group bonuses are given (i.e. the use of group schemes). 
Asymmetrical information is most likely the case for many of the employer-employee 
relationship in the data studied in this thesis. Thus, we will most likely be observing both 
the problem of moral hazard and the free rider problem. 
 
Asymmetrical information 
The distribution of information can be described as asymmetrical if both parties do not 
have access to the same information, or one party has information which the other party 
does not have at all. The unbalanced possession of information creates an imbalance in the 
relationship between the two parties, and when there is imbalance, one of the parties might 
be relatively worse off than if the information was symmetrical (i.e. both parties share the 
same information). In the employer-employee relationship the employer can be relatively 
worse off by paying the employee for work that was not performed according to the 
criteria set by the employer. In situations where the employee is relatively worse off, the 
employee might not receive a wage lower than what he could have been expecting paid a 
straight salary. The employee perspective should, however, be regarded as less problematic 
in the Principal-Agent theory. I will explain the situation where the employer is relatively 
worse off in more detail under moral hazard. The information asymmetry is not only 
connected to information, but also action. There are two types of asymmetrical information 
(Arrow, 1985): hidden action and hidden information.  
 
Hidden action addresses the difficulties for the principal of observing the agent’s 
behaviour. This is a problem because the payment process is usually constructed in such a 
way as to motivate the agent to put in more effort if the agent wants higher pay. If the 
agent does not perform according to the agreed wage criteria, the foundation for setting the 
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wage is incorrect. Another aspect of the hidden action problem is that it might contribute to 
unfair payment methods between various agents. If, for instance, agent A were to receive 
100 NOK hourly pay while exercising 50% effort, and agent B were to receive 100 NOK 
hourly pay while exercising 75% effort, agent B would be relatively worse off than agent 
A although the hourly pay rate is the same for both agents. 
 
In the case of hidden information, unlike the above, the principal and agent is 
symmetrically informed at the time they enter into the contractual agreement. However, 
after entering into the agreement, the agent acquires more information (his hidden 
information). “The agent in the hidden information model observes the random factors 
influencing the outcome before choosing her action” (Petersen, 1993:279). In other words, 
hidden information describes a possible situation where the agent has information 
regarding the environment. The information held by the agent also makes the agreement 
between principal and agent less stable as the agent makes decisions based on information 
held only by the agent. “More complicated Principal-Agent relations arise when not only 
is the principal unable to monitor the agent, but also the agent possesses information 
about his environment, (…), which the principal does not” (Grossman & Hart, 1983:180). 
The hidden information model thus suggests that the agent may alter his behaviour after 
the contractual agreement has been laid. 
 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard relates to individual pay schemes where an agent chooses to do less work 
than the principal’s target rate. This is referred to as the moral hazard problem 
(Holmström, 2003). In some cases, moral hazard is used as being equivalent to the problem 
of asymmetrical information in a broader sense. Nevertheless, one important difference 
between the more general term of asymmetric information and moral hazard is that in the 
case of moral hazard the agent may choose to behave differently if the agent does not bear 
the consequences of its action. An example of this can be if the level of pay is pre-
determined to the outcome of the situation, i.e. pay is not dependent on the success of the 
agent. In other words, the agent does not bear the consequences of poor decision making or 
achieving less than what is desirable by the principal. This issue is often set in connection 
to the moral of the agent. Straight salary might be viewed as an example of a situation 
where the level of pay is pre-determined to the outcome. Moral hazard can thus also be 
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viewed as a greater problem when paid a straight salary than a variable wage, as a high 
level of variable wage might limit the problem of moral hazard. Further, moral hazard is 
connected to a problem of observation: “The source of this moral hazard, or incentive 
problem, is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results because individual 
action cannot be observed and hence contracted upon” (Holmström, 2003:126). This 
raises the question as to what extent the principal is able to have control over what the 
agent does. 
 
In order for the principal to contract the agent’s performance, there has to be an outcome 
which can be observed. As there are several problems encountered under various forms of 
information, there is neither a system of total control nor a system devoid of any control. A 
system based on trust is one possible solution to the problem; however, in order to rely on 
trust it would be necessary for all agents to have strong morals. And yet, the principal 
would still need to be able to observe the trustworthiness of the agents. 
 
A problem of observation relates to the monitoring problem. Monitoring is a source of 
information and might help the principal ensure that the quantity and quality of work are 
performed optimally according to the principal’s preferences. The possibilities for the 
principal to monitor the agent are subject to change under different circumstances. Such 
circumstances can be dependent on whether the employee does or does not have a fixed 
location of work (i.e. whether he has to travel to work). If the employee does not have a 
fixed location of work, this might impact the measurability of how work is preformed. One 
way of monitoring employees is to hire supervisors. By having a sufficient number of 
supervisors, the principal may be better prepared to create the correct incentives, in terms 
of pay, for the agent. Another possibility is to influence the internal norm system within 
the firm, which can be done by creating group commission schemes. However, such 
schemes are also subject to information loss, potentially leading to the free rider problem. 
 
 
The free rider problem 
The free rider problem relates to group commission schemes. The problem is best 
illustrated by describing situations where some team members (i.e. employees) put in less 
effort than other members of the team, and still reap the same benefits as the other team 
members. It is possible for the group to achieve the same goals even if some individuals do 
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not contribute to the collective good. This, however, may induce more effort from those 
who contributed in the first place. The free rider problem is thus only found in group 
commission schemes (i.e. teams of employees). The free-rider problem “may, however, be 
overcome by the construction of appropriate target rates, where a high wage is received by 
every team member if the production target is reached, and otherwise a low wage if the 
target rate is not reached” (Petersen, 1993a:287).  
 
So far we have seen that by using common sense, we will most likely overcome many of 
the information problems, especially through solutions related to observation and 
monitoring. Also, empirical studies give support to the importance of the monitoring effect 
on employee effort, as shown in a study done at Vauxhall Motors Ltd, which suggested 
team-based arrangements to eliminate the free rider problem (Pearson, 1960). Vauxhall 
Motors Ltd had created a competitive environment where each group of employees was 
supervised and given detailed information as to what level their production was at for each 
week of production. The assumption was that if one member did not perform, his peers or 
supervisor would tell him. Each unproductive employee would reduce the group’s 
eligibility for a higher bonus as a group commission scheme was used. The solution to the 
problem of free riders was to hire managers to monitor each group of employees and to 
constantly inform the group of employees on how to achieve their group bonus (Pearson, 
1960). This way, the managers would inform the groups of employee’s on how they where 
doing in order to achieve the target rate, and the employees in the group would ensure that 
all the member of this group performed according to the target rate. By doing so, the 
managers did not have to monitor each employee, only the group of employees. 
 
I have now defined the boundaries of the Principal-Agent model. There are several aspects 
to be considered in the employer-employee relationship. One of the main aspects is 
information: The employer (principal) constantly needs to focus on whether the correct 
incentives are given in order to overcome the various information problems. Incentives 
relate, in particularly, to creating the appropriate target rates. Another way of solving the 
information problem is by hiring managers to monitor the employees. A third possibility, 
which has not yet been discussed, is the selection effect in occupations. It is possible that 
there is some sort of selection process at work in the recruitment of employees into various 
occupations. This recruitment process might be based on employee preferences for 
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entering a particular occupation as well as employer preferences for a particular “type” of 
employee. 
 
The selection effect in occupations 
The recruitment practice of the employer, and the distribution of employees into 
occupations, is important to discuss as it is common to identify particularly female and 
male dominated occupations. Selection effects and sorting are correlated with the element 
of information in the Principal-Agent model as discussed in this chapter. Therefore, the 
hypothesis I propose in this section can be viewed as testing elements of Principal-Agent 
relationships.  
 
To some extent, an occupational group which is female or male dominated may also reflect 
employer attitudes towards recruitment practices, favouring one gender over another 
(Petersen & Snartland, 2004). There is complete sex segregation in output-related pay 
systems if all men are in pay-for-performance occupations or establishments, and all 
females are in non-output related pay systems. Meyersson-Milgrom, Petersen and 
Snartland (2001) find that occupational sex segregation explains more of the wage gap in 
Norway and Sweden than in the U.S. In other words, it is between occupational groups that 
the largest wage differentials are found, and not within. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that if females are paid lower hourly wages in output-related pay systems, the gender wage 
gap can be due to different recruitment practices in occupations. To find out how gender is 
allocated with regards to different pay systems, I will test how the ratio of females and 
males receiving variable wages is distributed in the wholesale and retail trade. We already 
know that the wholesale trade is male dominated while there are more females employed in 
retail than males, and it is also more common for males than females to receive variable 
wages (NOU, 1997). What is not known is how large the difference between female and 
male distribution in straight salary and variable wages are. I propose the following 
hypothesis in order to investigate the distribution of males and females into different pays 
systems in the wholesale and retail trade: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): How large is the difference between males and females receiving 
variable wages in the wholesale and retail trade? 
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When establishing the male/female ratio in an output-related wage system, we can ask (a) 
what is the size of the differences between males and females when males and females 
work in occupations where variable wages are paid; and (b) how large is employees’ gain 
when receiving variable wages than when paid a straight salary. Further, we might 
investigate the assumption that females receive a significantly lower hourly base wage plus 
bonus compared to males by proposing the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Females receive a significantly lower base wage plus bonus than 
males. 
 
After establishing the variations in the male/female ratio of employees in occupations 
paying output-related wages, and investigating the size of the difference between males 
and females, the next step to gain some further insight into how employees are sorted into 
given occupations might be to observe a characteristic such as distribution on educational 
level for the two groups (straight salary receivers and variable wage). Based on the 
Principal-Agent model, the employer knows that motivation is necessary to achieve the 
desired effort from the employee. But do employers have the same need to monitor all 
employees? Is it possible that some employees are more likely to have higher morals than 
others? I assume that people in output-related pay systems have a higher hourly income 
than those who are paid a straight salary. Normally, comparisons within the pay system of 
straight salary show a linear relationship between hourly wage and educational level. We 
can therefore assume that higher education leads to higher wages. If variable wage 
recipients are paid more than the ones paid a straight salary, the relationship of pay level 
might also induce that the group of variable wage recipients also are in different education 
groups than the recipients of straight salary. In the wholesale and retail trade the 
relationship of education and wage may, on the other hand, be the other way around, i.e. a 
high variable wage might be correlated with low education. Why might this be so? One 
viewpoint would attribute this to the monitoring principle, as described above in this 
chapter. An employee with high education can be said to be less risky in terms of moral 
hazard as the principal can observe the outcome of the agent’s former results from 
attaining education. The characteristics observable to the principal on the agent’s past 
performance might indicate what type of person the agent is. One question the principal 
might ask is whether the agent motivated for working or need motivation. This viewpoint 
thus also supports the position that an agent with low education is possibly a greater risk as 
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the principal can not observe any characteristics regarding the performance or 
achievements of the agent. In other words, a high level of education may be consistent with 
a low risk of moral hazard, even when paid a straight salary. More broadly, I suggest that it 
is more common to find low education correlated with a variable wage rather than high 
education. The reason for this is that agents with high education do not need to be 
motivated or observed through variable wage systems and are therefore also more likely to 
be paid a straight salary. I therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Recipients of variable wages are distributed differently in education 
than the recipients of straight salary. 
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2.2 The flexible firm 
This section is organised as follows: First, I will discuss Atkinson’s (1984) different forms 
of flexibility; second, I will explain why this is relevant to this thesis; and third, I will 
introduce some aspects of the “dual focus” of exploration and exploitation that firms are 
meant to have, based on the management literature.11 
 
By flexibility I mean the ability of firms to adapt to changes in the market. In order to allow 
rapid changes to take place within the organisation, and being able to compete, firms need 
variable expenses. Variable expenses allow the firm to channel cash flow to where it is 
needed at various times. The firm’s equity thus becomes flexible. From a sociological 
point of view, there are three main explanations regarding the development, use and 
variations of economical incentives, which relate to changes in the expenses and how 
money is put to use in a firm: (1) governmental framework (i.e. legislation and taxation), 
(2) structural changes (i.e. trade and job structure, education level and technology), and (3) 
changes in the organisation of the labour market (i.e. new organisational structures within 
and between firms, new strategies for work organisation) (Langeland, 1995:102). These 
three explanations are all important as each partly explains variations between firms and 
development over the years. It is therefore helpful to keep these explanations in mind when 
addressing “drives” for financial flexibility. 
 
Why are theories of the flexible firm important to this thesis? 
Theories of the flexible firm are important to this thesis as flexibility might explain why 
firms organise wages differently, and why wage components are interesting in the first 
place from an employer perspective. Financial flexibility can explain the purpose of 
variable wages, and might provide solid grounds for explaining the use of wage 
components in Norway, as the theory emphasises behavioural pattern for the firm and why 
it is necessary for a firm to have a high degree of financial flexibility in order to meet, for 
instance, competition from other firms. Financial flexibility is especially important for a 
firm as it indicates the level of variable costs a firm is able to cut when expenses are too 
high. There is especially one field where structural changes have been investigated, namely 
industrial sociology. One important study done in industrial sociology in Norway is in the 
                                                 
11 Of all the managerial literature I will focus on entrepreneurial literature, in particular the works of J.G. 
March (1991) and his dual focus of the firm. 
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“community of employees” (Lysgaard, 1985). One of the main problems in this empirical 
investigation is the employees’ ability to protect themselves from becoming a mere 
instrument of production in the technical-economical system. An example of this might be 
if variable wages only consisted of the bonus wage component and the employees 
therefore were dependent on maintaining a high level of effort at all times or else their 
wages would face drastic decreases. However, this setting is rarely ever found in Norway, 
as there almost always is a base wage component in addition to the variable bonus. 
 
The model 
Atkinson’s (1984) theory of the flexible firm aims to explain differences in organisational 
behaviour on the basis of changes to, in particular, demand side factors. Atkinson (1984) 
categorises the flexible patterns in a firm by three main types of flexibility, namely 
numerical flexibility, functional flexibility and financial flexibility. It is, however, 
important to discuss both numerical and functional flexibility as these forms of flexibility 
are the ones which form the basis for financial flexibility. A well-developed firm, in terms 
of production and management, creates opportunities and sustainable advantages for the 
firm based on a differentiated way of production. “The customers demand a highly 
differentiated product and demand is more rapidly changing compared to earlier” (Olberg, 
1995:8). The theory of the flexible firm builds on the declining patterns of Fordism and 
Taylorism in production and management (Olberg, 1995). Thus to achieve a sustainable 
advantage when competing with other firms in terms of creating differentiated products 
and facing demands in the market, financial flexibility is necessary. 
 
Numerical flexibility 
Numerical flexibility refers to a situation where a company makes quantitative adjustments 
when facing market demands (i.e. varying number of employees and hours worked). In 
order to achieve flexibility, firms hire part-time workers and workers with a flexible work 
schedule (i.e. work nights, weekends and so forth). By doing so, a company is more able to 
adapt to sudden changes in supply- and demand-side factors. Numerically flexible 
employees are characterised by having a loose connection to the firm. In other words, 
numerically flexible employees are expendable and easily replaced by the firm. 
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For the purpose of achieving my main research objective, I postulate a hypothesis based on 
changes to the number of employees receiving variable wages. The number of employees 
is in general likely to increase in the wholesale and retail trades. It will therefore yield 
more accurate results to see if the number of employees receiving variable wage increases 
as a proportion of the number of employees in the trade, that is, if the ratio of variable 
wage receivers changes relative to the number of employees receiving straight salary. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The number of employees receiving variable wages increases over 
time. 
 
Functional flexibility  
Functional flexibility refers to non-expendable employees. One reason for employees not 
to be expendable could be that they possess specific knowledge about the production 
process of the firm. The functional flexible employees are a core group who are able to 
introduce new processes into current structures. Another important aspect of functional 
flexibility is the ability to inform and train new personnel (i.e. often personnel defined as 
the numerical flexible group of employees) in work tasks. The functional flexible group 
makes the process run smoothly over time. A study done by Statistics Norway in 199812 
showed that 57% of the workers had changed work tasks, 54% got new leaders, 48% met 
stricter demands at work, 33% changed the hours they worked and the wage system under 
which they worked, and 25% got a new position within their firm. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume that employees defined to be in the group of functional flexible workers are 
necessary in order to implement and make such changes adaptable in the firm. Figure 2.2 
presents Atkinson’s (1984) model of the flexible firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The SSB report is referenced in NOU 1999, Vol. 34. 
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Figure 2.2: Labour market structures under conditions of the 
flexible accumulation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Curson, 1986:151 
 
 
Financial flexibility – control over expenses 
Numerical flexibility: contributes by number of employees and 
flexibility in wages of employees 
Functional flexibility: contributes by employees with specialised 
knowledge on how to perform core production tasks 
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Financial flexibility 
The model in Figure 2.2 shows how numerical and functional flexibility can influence 
financial flexibility within the firm. Here, I will first elaborate on some of the basic 
concepts of financial flexibility, explaining the above model in greater detail. Then I will 
look further into three aspects that might influence financial flexibility: (1) size of firm, (2) 
geographical differences in competition, (3) wage bargaining in the private sector and (4) 
policies 
 
Financial flexibility in a firm can be defined as the ability to adjust to rapid changes in the 
market. One way of increasing this flexibility is by the ability to cut cost when necessary 
and channel the flow of money to areas that generate the most revenue. Fixed costs cannot 
easily be cut. Seen from the perspective of a firm’s ability to be prepared for rapid changes 
in the market and face competition better, it is rational for a firm to have its proportion of 
variable costs as high as possible. One of the largest costs for a firm is the one of paying 
wages. The cost of paying wages varies by the number of employees and the amount of 
pay per employee. This is however, not unproblematic, as unions often seem to be 
reluctant towards variable wages, although it does not include firing employees or failing 
to pay what has been promised. However, a main distinction between two types of variable 
wages needs to be made: (1) bonus based on completing sales (i.e. the employee knows 
how much bonus he will get and when to get it, i.e. when the sale is made final), and (2) 
profit sharing/firm ownership. Both types reflect an aspect of financial flexibility. 
 
International tendencies show that in countries in the E.U. and in the U.S., the use of 
variable wage components is widespread, and the growth of using such payment schemes 
was particularly strong in the mid 1980s. Several reasons are given in the literature for this 
increase in the number of individuals paid in output-related pay schemes: increasing global 
competition, structural and technological changes, political regulations and new forms of 
labour organisation and management. In England and the U.S, tax benefits motivate 
employers to use variable wages (Langeland, 1995:230). In France, legislation ensures 
profit sharing among employees in companies with more than 50 employees, and France is 
also the E.U. country where it is fairly common with the use of bonuses. In Norway, an 
overview of the use of different pay schemes or financial incentives has yet to be made. 
Surveys show that straight salary is what is most used both by firms and employers. This 
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indicates that the bonus arrangement is something the average firm and employee are 
somewhat resistant to (Langeland, 1995:112). A low rate of output-related pay systems can 
in general be explained by the lack of incentives for employers to use such structures. 
Therefore it can be said to be up to the individual firm to decide whether they will benefit 
from having variable wages or not. In the wholesale trade variable wages are particularly 
common, based on the definition of wholesale and retail (SSB, 2007). This does, however, 
also induce that if for any reason sales should drop more than excepted in a given period, 
the firm need to compensate the decrease in income from a decrease in expenses. 
 
Size of firm 
“Flexibility is a key mechanism to control investment dynamics, which arise because of the 
irreversibility of real and financial decisions and the uncertainty related to them” 
(Lindström & Hasmati, 2004:3). The data used in this study allows to observe if the 
distribution of variable wages is different from straight salary in various sizes of firms. 
One reason for why it might be interesting to investigate differences in sizes of firms is due 
to that it might reveal information regarding the issue of how firm use bonuses not only as 
a motivational factor but as a mean of observation. In a firm with few employees, the 
contribution made by each employee can be said to be observable to the employer. In 
larger firms, it will be harder to monitor each employee. Therefore I will assume that larger 
firms observe their employees less, and that the bonus might increase as the need to 
monitor employees goes up. “The incidence of variable pay schemes varies according to a 
number of characteristics of the employing organisations concerned. Size seems to be an 
important characteristic: the larger the organisation, the more frequent the incidence of 
variable pay” (European Industrial Observatory on-line, 2001). The base wage component 
does not necessarily increase on the basis of the same criteria as the bonus component. If 
the base wage component varies with size of firm, this might be due to the economic 
situation of firms, where those with better placed also pay higher wages. Research has 
shown that larger companies also have a higher income profile than small and medium 
sized companies, and large firms are therefore also more eligible to pay their employees 
higher wages than smaller companies (Boye & Kinserdal, 1992; Cosh & Hughes, 1994). 
 
From the perspective of a small company, for instance a start-up company, it would be 
rational to have variable wages in order to increase firm flexibility. Variable wages make it 
 32
possible to have a low base wage followed by a high bonus. Whether the bonus component 
leads to high or low pay will be determined by the criteria for receiving the bonus. 
Structuring a variable wage according to specific criteria makes more sense for small firms 
as it allows for a very high degree of financial flexibility. In other words, the employees 
may receive a low wage when revenue is low (usually in an early phase of a firm), but if 
the firm succeed in increasing their firm’s revenue and grow larger, the employees are 
likely to receive a base wage plus bonus that is higher than what they would receive if paid 
a straight salary. 
 
According to March (1991), a firm faces the constant difficulty of balancing exploitation 
and exploration activities, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. Further, exploitation and exploration 
is referred to as the “dual focus” of the firm, as it describes differences in organisational 
structures between firms and the processes firms focus on. When applying March’s 
exploitation versus exploration framework to the effect of a firm’s size on wages, the 
theory suggests that smaller companies implement flexible payment schemes in order to be 
the drive for firm expansion through motivating to innovative processes. This is because 
smaller companies will be more likely to focus on exploration as they have fewer 
opportunities to benefit from economies of scale and scope, for example. One of the 
prerequisites of exploitation activities is financial efficiency and keeping transaction costs 
low (see, for example, Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975)). Small firms cannot achieve 
this efficiency through economies of scale and scope, and thus they have to be more 
flexible in their financial reward system, despite a higher total transaction cost. Figure 2.3 
presents March’s (1991) interpretation of the dual focus that firms must have in their 
operations.  
 
The “dual focus” of exploitation and exploration that firms are meant to have can also be 
related to differences between small and large firms, where large firms are the ones which 
“exploit” while small firms “explore”. In the introduction I emphasised a trend in the 
development of the retail trade, where the small local firms disappear and national chains 
with many employees emerge. One problem that arises is whether the focus of the firms 
investigated in this thesis is more influenced by exploitation than exploration. 
 
Exploration is connected to experimentation, learning, flexibility, variation and discovery. 
Such exploration is characteristic of smaller firms that aim to grow larger. Our knowledge 
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of the development of firms in the wholesale and retail trades and March’s (1991) notion 
of the “dual focus” that firms should have suggest that the wholesale trade is less 
dominated by “exploration” and more by “exploitation”. Atkinson’s (1984) flexible firm 
thesis leads me to suggest two types of financial flexibility – one which relates to 
exploration and one which relates to exploitation. The first type of flexibility adequately 
describes the financial flexibility found in small firms (hereafter referred to as financial 
flexibility of small firms). Small firms’ financial flexibility is characterised by a need to 
motivate employees. When there are few employees in a firm, they might even agree to 
have a low base wage. If they work hard so that the firm, is able to grow and increase its 
revenue, the bonus payment might be significantly larger than what they would otherwise 
receive. In other words, they are compensated for the risk of accepting a lower base wage 
if the firm succeeds. 
 
Exploitation is characterised by implementation, efficiency, refinement, selection and 
execution. The concept is a suitable tool for describing established firms or what often are 
larger firms in the case of the wholesale and retail trades. However, the concept needs to be 
extended as the notion of flexibility needs to be included in the exploitation model. The 
second type of financial flexibility is the one found in large firms (hereafter called 
financial flexibility of large firms). The financial flexibility of large firms has a different 
purpose from the flexibility found in the exploration model, which was said to characterise 
small firms. What is similar is that both forms of financial flexibility require a firm to have 
variable costs. But in the case of large firms flexibility may be viewed as requiring the 
monitoring of employees in order to align the individual preferences with the ones of the 
firm, rather than as aiming to motivate employees based on their personal preferences for 
achieving desirable goals. 
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Figure 2.3: The dual focus of firms 
 
Source: March, J.G., 1991 
 
When considering the dual focus of firms, firms use different incentives in different 
development stages and variable wages can be used to monitor and motivate employees. 
 
I have now discussed the significance of a firm’s size and considered several aspects that 
might influence the patterns of wage formation in small and large size firms. Variable 
wages create financial flexibility in a firm’s expenditure. Applying March’s (1991) theory 
of the dual focus of firms, it seems that there is a greater focus on exploitation than on 
exploration in the retail and wholesale trades. It seems to make sense for larger firms to 
pay higher variable wages than smaller firms, because large firms seem to have a more 
efficient use of monitoring in order to ensure efficiency, implementation and execution of 
new tasks. This proposition leads to investigate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Large firms pay higher variable wages than firms with few employees. 
 
When investigating hypothesis 6, I will also consider the effect of size of firm on straight 
salary in order to be able to say something about differences between straight salary and 
variable wages. Another issue that will be considered is to what extent variable pay is 
really relevant for investigating differences in the size of firms and how the use of bonuses 
varies with size of firms. One problem with discussing the size of a bonus and its impact 
on the hourly wage is whether the size of a bonus is likely to have an impact on the 
financial flexibility of firms; how large does individual bonuses need to be in order to have 
a theoretical impact on the flexibility of a firm? 
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One possible solution to the problem of the size of a bonus might be to compare bonus (i.e. 
bonus measured as a percentage of hourly salary) with the development of the general 
wage growth. If, for instance, a bonus is 10% of the hourly pay while annual wage growth 
is 4%, one could then make the assumption that individual bonus is of a significant size. In 
this study, I will consider a bonus below 4% of hourly pay as indicating a low level of 
financial flexibility, a bonus of 4% as indicating a medium level of financial flexibility, 
and a bonus above 4% as indicating a high level of financial flexibility. In a study done on 
national wage levels and the yearly development in wage growth, Hansen and Skoglund 
(2003) finds that mean wages grew by an annual of 8.5%  in 1980-89  and 4.6% in 1990-
2002. However, when adjusting for real wage growth (adjusted for inflation) the annual 
numbers where only 0.6% in 1980-89 and 2.1% in 1990-2002 in Norway (Hansen & 
Skoglund, 2003:45). 
 
I have now argued there may be differences in wages based on a firm’s size, and that this 
may partly be explained by a different focus (i.e. financial flexibility of small firms vs. 
financial flexibility of large firms). Also, the competitive environment of firms of different 
sizes might be a factor that leads to differences in wage levels. Another important factor 
that might influence the wage level of a firm is the geographical region in which it is 
operating.  
  
Geographical differences in competition 
Different regions have different competitive environments, and the importance of regions 
has been focused on intensely (NOU, 2004 vol. 19 “Sustainable Regions”). 13 Arguably, 
there is a close link between competition and financial flexibility as competition defines 
many of a firm’s actions. An example of competition can be if two firms strive for the 
same customer base within a region. According to principles of fairness (Høgsnes, 
1994:178) one might assume that unions push for “equal wage for equal work”. This 
would induce that employees in the same occupations pay the same wages across regions. 
On the other hand, differences between regions are common in terms of pay (Barth & 
Dale-Olsen, 2003). Competition within regions may lead to financial flexibility being of 
variable importance in different regions. Financial flexibility depends on the needs of the 
firm. Thus, variable wages, as a form of financial flexibility, might vary across regions. 
                                                 
13 Title translated by author. 
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Even though occupations may fall into the same categories in different regions, variations 
in how occupations are rewarded might tell us something about the flexibility with which 
firms and individual employees approach the setting of wages. There is thus reason to 
believe that there are variations in the distribution of variable pay between regions within 
the same occupations, and these variations are also the case for straight salary. However, if 
there are differences between variable wages and straight salary within the same regions 
and in the same occupation this might contradict the principles of fairness. I propose the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Employees receiving base wage plus bonus earn higher wages 
compared with those who receive straight salary when working in the 
same occupation, and in the same region. 
 
Wage bargaining in the private sector and employer flexibility 
Here, I will briefly introduce some general elements of wage bargaining. In addition, I will 
present how wage bargaining can increase employer flexibility. It is of essences to know 
something about wage bargaining in order to discuss how wages develop both within a 
single year and over time. Policies and employer motivation for pursuing wage levels is 
important to understand when addressing the relationship of both wages in general and the 
flexibility created in wage systems. 
 
For most of the private sector, wage setting is the result of a two-stage process. First, 
central negotiations at industry or the national confederation establish a minimum increase. 
Second, the negotiations are followed by local firm-level bargaining. This is refered to as 
decentralised bargaining. The local negotiations adjust the wage levels above the 
minimum, set by central negotiations. In the private sector, wage levels at the local firm-
level bargaining are often decided by the firm; 
 
A major difference between the role of more decentralized negotiations in the 
public and private sector is that in the private industries the parties are 
relatively free to determine the level of local wage growth, based mainly on 
productivity changes and the ‘pay ability’ of the firm. (Longva and Høgsnes 
2001:153).  
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Historically, it is the employers in Norway, and not the government, who have encouraged 
centralised wage setting. And centralised wage bargaining is the most important form of 
wage setting in the private sector of Norway (Bowman, 2002). Bowman (2002) 
investigates an alternative hypothesis proposed by Iversen (1999); decentralized wage 
bargaining (i.e. local negotiations) is necessary in order to raise firm flexibility. This is, 
however, not the case in Norway, according to Bowman (2002), as it is more important to 
avoid tendencies of inflation in the economy. It is assumed that an extensive use of 
decentralised wage bargaining might lead to inflation: if wages rise drastically for some 
groups compare to others, tendencies of inflation might occur. One important aspect of 
preventing inflation from happen is to have moderate wage growth. And this is why it is 
argued by some that the persistence of centralised wage setting is the effect of a cross-class 
coalition of the employers in Norway. 
 
Longva and Høgsnes (2001) argue in favour of something I will characterise as centralised 
decentralisation when it comes to wage bargaining. Centralised decentralisation suggests 
that the wage bargaining structure induce a high degree of flexibility, allowing 
decentralised wage bargaining when necessary and otherwise centralised bargaining. This 
can also be said to be a more flexible solution to the firms, as it will allow firms to decide 
wage levels based on their own ability to set terms for employee wages. Policy changes 
can lead to changes in wages and how these are negotiated and distributed. The policy 
changes will thus also influence the flexibility of the firm.  
 
Policy development 
There are three main stages of political influence affecting how wage levels are set, for the 
years investigated in this thesis. The first period was from 1980-1986, and is characterised 
by little to no interference with the wage negotiations. In 1986, there was a deep economic 
crisis in Norway. The crisis was probably caused by an overheated economy following the 
liberal period from 1986 with high wage growth (Longva & Høgsnes, 2001:148) and a 
large fall in the price of raw oil (NOU, 1995). Mainly as a result of this, the economy 
became more unstable. Secondly, in 1988-89, an important decision by the wage board was 
that there should be a “ceiling” on the local wage drift (in Norwegian: Kronetaket). In 
relative terms, a policy of this kind will most likely reduce the wage growth of the highest 
paid and increase the growth of the lowest paid. From 1990 and to the mid 90s, the central 
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negotiations was characterised by a moderate wage policies. The moderate line was based 
on the period of 1988-89, but formally institutionalised by the Solidarity Alternative in 
1993. The Solidarity Alternative can be viewed as a form of centralised decentralisation as 
mention by Longva and Høgsnes (2001). 
 
The Solidarity Alternative aimed to reduce rates of unemployment. Central element of the 
Solidarity Alternative was to have; (1) a solidaristic wage policy (i.e. suggesting moderate 
wage growth), (2) an active labour market policy (i.e. low unemployment), and (3) to 
increase competition with economies abroad through income political objectives (NOU, 
1998; Longva & Høgsnes, 2001). There was considerable political consensus among the 
parties in the labour market regarding continuing centralised wage negotiation. The 
Solidarity Alternative suggested lower relative income growth for high income groups, and 
higher relative income growth for low income groups, so that most employees would 
benefit from the general development of wages. By pursuing a policy of moderate wage 
growth, Norway would decrease its rate of unemployment and be better equipped for 
foreign competition. If more people were employed, exports would increase and imports 
decrease (NOU, 2000). In order to see how wage bargaining and policies such as the 
solidarity alternative may have influenced the development and the use of bonuses, I 
propose the following hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Relative differences in the bonus component are equal among the 
variable wage receivers over time. 
 
The investigation of relative differences should indicate if the distribution of bonus has 
changed for the recipients of the bonus. Such a change in distribution could be the effect of 
one of two factors: (1) The employees who previously received a high bonus are now 
receiving a lower bonus relative to those who previously received a low bonus indicating 
that moderate wage development have distributed the size of bonus “downwards”; (2) the 
employees who previously received a high bonus are now receiving a lower bonus relative 
to those who previously received a low bonus due to an increase in the amount of pay 
given as bonus. This presupposes that the amount of bonuses available for employees 
increase in the trades rather than a shift in how these bonuses is distributed between 
different segments. 
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In Figure 2.4, the hypotheses postulated in this chapter is summarised and their relations to 
the two research questions stated in the introduction.  
 
To sum up, I have now elaborated on Principal-Agent models and financial flexibility for 
the firm. On the basis of theory and previous research eight hypothesises has been 
formulated and will be investigated/discussed, and make further comparisons with the data. 
The hypothesises will be investigated/discussed in Chapter Four, with two exceptions. The 
hypothesis related to education (H4), and the hypothesis related to the gender distribution 
in output-related pay systems (H2) will be investigated in Chapter Three.  
 
In Chapter Three, I will introduce the data and consider the methodology used in the 
analyses. 
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Figure 2.4: Connection between hypothesises and research questions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research questions 
 
Hypothesis 
H1: Employees who receive a base wage 
plus bonus have higher hourly pay than 
employees on straight salary. 
H7: Employees receiving base wage plus 
bonus earn higher wages compared with 
those who receive straight salary when 
working in the same occupation, and in the 
same region. 
H8: Relative differences in the bonus 
component are equal among the variable 
wage receivers over time. 
H5: The number of employees receiving 
variable wages increases over time. 
1. What is the 
effect of a bonus 
on wage levels? 
 
  
H6: Large firms pay higher variable wages 
than firms with few employees. 
H4: Recipients of variable wages is 
distributed differently in education than the 
recipients of straight salary. 
H3: Females receive a significantly lower 
base wage plus bonus than males. 
2. What are the 
individual 
characteristics of 
the recipients of 
bonus payments 
compared to 
non-bonus 
recipients? 
H2: How large is the difference between 
males and females receiving variable wages 
in the wholesale and retail trade? 
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3 Data and methodology 
In this chapter I will first give an overview of the data, which variables have been used and 
explain why they have been selected. Data loss was experienced for three of the years. This 
will also be discussed here. In addition, I will give a detailed description of the variables 
and how they have been made operational. Second, I will discuss limitations to the data, 
and finally, I will describe the methodology used in this thesis.  
 
3.1 Description of the data 
I have been fortunate to be a part of the project “Inclusion of women, ethnic minorities and 
seniors in work life: recruitment, occupations, pay and career course”, an on-going 
research project at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography at the University 
of Oslo in collaboration with the Department of Sociology at the University of California, 
Berkeley. During this project I have had access to raw data collected by Statistics Norway 
(SSB) on individuals working in retail and wholesale trade in Norway. The time span of 
the data is fourteen years, from 1983 to 1996. A total of 246 196 people were observed for 
at least one year. However, due to leaving and entering in the trades, the number of people 
is lower within a year than the total of unique individuals registered. There are more than 
950 000 observation-years (obs-years)14 in the data. Each individual is followed for about 4 
years on an average. The variation in the number of individuals observed yearly is 
probably caused by people leaving and entering wholesale and retail.  
 
In this thesis, analysis is limited to full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 67 years. 
Full-time workers are defined as individuals working 35-40 hours a week. The reason for 
excluding part-time employees is that they are a very small group in the data (numbering 
only 949 individuals). By restricting the pool of observations to people working full-time 
and receiving a bonus, an additional 185 360 observation-years are lost. The remaining 
769 478 observation-years are the population of full-time workers. The bonus group 
accounts for 19% of the population, comprised of 73% men and 27% women. All 
individuals in this group received a bonus in at least one year of the 14 year-long time 
period, but with large variations according to trade and gender: it is males in wholesale 
who are the largest group of bonus recipients in these data.  
                                                 
14 Observation-year refers to the total sum of individual-observations throughout the period of 1983-1996. 
The number of obs-years is thus higher than the amount of individuals observed for each year. 
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Two main groups are being compared: (1) all full-time employees between the age of 20 
and 67 years receiving straight salary, and (2) all full-time employees between the age of 
20 and 67 years receiving base wage plus bonus. The two groups are thus mutually 
exclusive within a single year. However, it is not unlikely that individuals might have 
received a straight salary in some years, and a base wage plus bonus in other years. 
 
The data contain a wide range of individuals employed in different occupations and 
establishments. The total number of occupations was 10415 and the total number of 
establishments 30 240 during the 14 years. For each year, the number of occupational 
groups and establishments will vary from the total as definition of occupations and 
institutional framework changes throughout the period. Investigations done in this thesis 
looks at the three levels of analyses; population, occupation and establishment. The levels 
will all be explained in detail later in this Chapter. 
 
The sample is not limited to a specific part of Norway; instead, all of Norway’s 
municipalities are represented, as there is extensive information regarding the wholesale 
and retail trades. Due to changes in how the data is reported it is not possible to single out 
municipalities after 1988. In 1988, there was a change in the municipality coding16 for the 
wholesale and retail trade. In order to overcome the issue of changes in definition of 
municipalities, regions based on the location of the municipalities has been created. The 
definition of the regions follows the standard of Statistics Norway, and will be further 
elaborated on in the description of the region variable. For employees in the wholesale and 
retail trades, the wage statistics cover all establishments in these industries with few 
exceptions. 
 
The analysis carried out are based on the hourly earnings for each wage component, i.e. 
straight salary, base wage and bonus. In addition, irregular earnings (i.e. compensation for 
working more than the regular hours) are reported. No information was available about the 
number of extra hours worked. Although benefits, comprising compensation given to the 
employee in the form of a free cell phone, company car, etc., are also reported in the data, 
these and irregular earning components are left out of the analysis. This was done because 
                                                 
15 For the 104 occupations, there are never more than 94 occupations within a year. The reason for this is that 
changes in the definition of occupational codes occurred before and after 1990, done by the SSB. 
16 Information retrieved from SSB. 
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of difficulties in calculating an hourly wage to represent irregular earnings and benefits. 
When excluding irregular earnings and benefits, the results are likely to better describe 
differences in hourly wages as it is not possible to estimate the individual return in terms of 
hourly earnings (Nielsen, Høgsnes & Petersen, 2004). In other words, it is assumed that 
irregular earnings and benefits would cause negative interference in the analysis. 
 
For most of the analysis, I use the logarithm of the hourly wage component, with one 
exception, i.e. in Figure 4.1, where absolute monthly bonus payments are reported. Where 
absolute wages are reported, the wage components will be adjusted according to the 
consumer price index (CPI). The CPI calculations used in this thesis are based on the mean 
annual CPI development, as reported by Statistics Norway.  
 
Comment on data loss 
There are data losses for three of the years in this investigation. These three years are 1993, 
1994 and 1996. The data loss consists of about 30% for each of these years. As a 
consequence, there are also fewer registered establishments for these years. It is uncertain 
what has caused the observations to be lost. As these observations were not found in the 
raw data, it is most likely due to human error in providing these. The data loss does not 
however, seem to be systematic, i.e. regions, females and males, recipients of bonus and 
non recipients are all observed for the years in question. And when analysing wage 
differentials within these years they follow the trend from previous years and 1995. 
Analyses have still been performed in these years, as the sample is still large. Results do 
not seem to deviate from previous years. However, when analysing number of 
employees/firms using the variable wage component, there is strong reason to believe that 
these estimates will be either to low or to high for theses years, where the latter is most 
likely the case. Interpretation of results for these years should therefore be handled with 
care. Furthermore, in this Chapter, notification will be given to the years and observations 
here referred. 
 
Definition of variables 
In this section, a thorough explanation of the different variables that are used and how they 
are constructed will be given. Here, the dependent, independent and control variables are 
introduced. Descriptive statistics will also be given for some of the variables. 
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Dependent Variables 
Four main dependent variables are used: (1) hourly straight salary, (2) hourly base wage, 
(3) hourly bonus and (4) hourly base wage plus bonus. The reason for measuring all wage 
components as hourly wage is to observe the wage differentials in the best possible way. 
As I have defined full-time employees as those working 35-40 hours a week, variations in 
weekly work schedule would have resulted in interference in the analysis if I had analysed 
monthly wage instead of hourly pay. 
 
1. Hourly straight salary (tlonn): The data provide information regarding the monthly 
salary and the number of hours worked, which allows us to calculate the hourly wages. 
 
For the remaining variables, the wage components are constructed based on the same 
principle as tlonn, the difference being the hourly pay the variable aims at (i.e. dependent 
variable 1, 2, 3 or 4). 
 
2. Hourly base wage (bwage): Hourly base wage is specific only for the group receiving a 
bonus. The hourly base wage refers to the agreed payment, before any bonus is calculated. 
The base wage is reported according to the same principles as the hourly straight salary in 
the data. 
 
3. Hourly bonus (tbonus): Hourly bonus refers to the bonus payment received. The bonus 
component is variable, i.e. not agreed to in advance, as is the case for the hourly base 
wage. The bonus is reported as 1/12 of the sum for each year, thus giving a monthly bonus 
payment in the data. This is the foundation used to calculate the hourly pay received from 
the bonus component. 
 
4. Hourly base wage plus bonus (bwage_b): This variable is a combination of the two 
previous variables, components 2 and 3. Component 4 consists of a fixed part (base wage) 
and the variable wage component (bonus). The variable can be viewed as equal to the 
straight salary as it is the total hourly wage component for the bonus receivers. 
 
Wage components 1 and 4 are mutually exclusive. Wage component 4 is, however, 
decomposed into two smaller measures: base wage (component 2) and bonus (component 
3). 
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Table 3.1 shows the distribution of employees in the wholesale and retail trades receiving 
straight salary and variable wages. Gender distribution is also shown. In the wholesale and 
retail trades, 81% of employees received a straight salary while 19% received variable 
wages throughout the period 1983 to 1996. It is in wholesale where the differences in the 
number of variable wage receivers are found. While only 2% of the females ever received 
a bonus, 11% of the males received a bonus. Comparing the number of variable wage 
receivers in retail shows that there are no differences. However, there are generally more 
employees in wholesale than in retail and wholesale is also a male dominated trade. Table 
3.1 answers the second hypothesis H2: How large is the difference between males and 
females receiving variable wages in the wholesale and retail trades? In wholesale, 11% of 
the males is a recipient of bonus, while only 2% are females. This is a 9 percentage point 
difference between gender. In retail, a bonus is received by 3% by both gender when 
comparing the total of the wholesale and retail trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Distribution on payment system, for all, by sex. 1983-
1996. 
 Straight salary Variable wage Total 
 Male  Female Male  Female   
Wholesale (%) 34 11 11 2 58 
N (obs-year) 322 697 106 478 104 782 23 587 557 544 
      
 Straight salary Variable wage  
 Male Female Male Female  
Retail (%) 17 19 3 3 42 
N (obs-year) 160 865 179 496 29 515 27 572 397 294 
Total     100 
N (obs-year)     954 838 
Note: Total number of observation for all years (1983-1996) is set 
at 100% 
 
The logarithm (logits) of hourly wage components: All of the four wage components, as 
described above, have been transformed into logits. There are several reasons for 
transforming the variables into logits. First, the transformation into logits may reduce the 
danger of skewed distribution and extreme values. This is due to the fact that logits make 
the distribution more even. Second, logits may make the models more theoretically 
satisfactory. The effect of the wage component is expressed in a percentage. When 
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expressed in a percentage, differences are also more internationally comparable (Ringdal, 
2001:419). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the transformation into logits makes the yearly variations in 
wage components more predictable and easier to work with since the wage components are 
not adjusted for the CPI in the original data set. 
 
Independent variables 
Region: The size of regional differences in pay components is investigated in this variable. 
I distinguish between the five main trade regions, as defined by SSB. The regional codes 
refer to the following areas; 1= Eastern region (Østfold, Akershus, Oslo, Hedmark, 
Oppland), 2= Southern region (Buskerud, Vestfold, Telemark, Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder), 
3= Western region (Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane), 4= Middle region (Møre and 
Romsdal, Sør-Trøndelag, Nord-Trøndelag) and 5= Northern region (Nordland, Troms, 
Finnmark, Svalbard and Jan Mayen). 
 
There are large differences between observation-years in the different regions. Regions 1 
and 2 have more or less the same number of observations, and regions 3 and 4 are also 
similar. In region 5 there are fewer observations, indicating that there are fewer employees 
in region 5 than, for instance, in region 1. Nevertheless, the variations in observations in 
regions will not influence the analysis since the observations mirror the true picture of 
employees in the various regions. Logically it makes sense that there are variations in the 
number of employees by region as there are also variations in the number of people living 
in the various regions. 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution in Regions 
 
Region N (obs-year) Share (%) 
1 273 257 29 
2 278 567 29 
3 179 889 19 
4 185 712 19 
5 37 391 4 
Total (obs-years) 954 838 100 
 
Sector: The variable divides the trades investigated: (1) wholesale trade and (2) retail trade. 
The reason for grouping the variable in the analysis is that they are different in both wage 
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composition and gender distribution. The sector variable will allow us to separate the effect 
of wholesale and retail, in order to see whether there are any differences or not.  
 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Sector 
 
Sector N (obs-years) Share % 
1 557 544 58 
2 397 294 42 
Total (obs-years) 954 838 100 
 
 
Size of firm: In order to look at differences in the size of companies, this variable counts 
the number of employees working in firms of equal size for each year (column 1). Column 
2 refers to the number of employees in firms of a certain size; column 3 gives the number 
of observations for each level of firm size; and column 4 gives the total distribution of the 
number of observations for each level of firm size. 
 
Table 3.4: Number of employees in firms of different size 
 
1 2 3 4 
Firm size code N. Employees N (obs-years) Share (%) 
1 1-5 221 103 23 
2 6-9 198 065 21 
3 10-19 182 920 19 
4 20-49 195 604 20 
5 50-802 157 146 17 
N (obs-years)  954 838 100 
 
 
Sex: Separating male and female individuals. Male is coded 0 and female is coded 1. When 
including the gender variable in the regression, we are able to detect gender differences. 
Also, we are able to detect whether there is co-variation in the wage components or not. 
Table 3.5 shows that the number of female observations ranges from 33.8% to 36.6% 
between years. Note that there is data loss for the years of 1993, 1994 and 1996 as 
previously described. 
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Table 3.5: Gender distribution by year (1983-1996) 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Year Male Female Total (N) Share female (%) 
1983 47 083 24 034 71 117 33,8 
1984 46 712 23 983 70 695 33,9 
1985 47 620 25 190 72 810 34,6 
1986 48 082 26 210 74 292 35,3 
1987 50 070 28 051 78 121 35,9 
1988 47 955 27 676 75 631 36,6 
1989 47 534 27 029 74 563 36,3 
1990 45 950 25 210 71 160 35,4 
1991 44 971 24 500 69 471 35,3 
1992 44 887 25 005 69 892 35,8 
1993 29 554 16 600 46 154 36 
1994 32 156 17 904 50 060 35,8 
1995 47 349 24 696 72 045 34,3 
1996 38 706 20 121 58 827 34,2 
N (obs-years) 618629 336209 954838 35,21 
 
Note: (1) Male (N), (2) Female (N), (3) Total (N), (4) Female ratio as a percentage of males. The 
total number of unique individuals shown in the table is 246 196. For each year N=the number of 
employees within that year. The N total (bottom line) is observation-years. The total number of 
unique individuals is 246 196 in the table. For each year N=the number of employees within that 
single year. The N total (bottom line) is observation-years. 
 
 
Control Variables 
Education: The educational variable is hierarchical and grouped in six dummy variables: 
1=primary and secondary school, 2=upper secondary school, started, 3=upper secondary 
school, finished, 4=upper secondary school, extension, 5=Bachelor, 6=Masters and higher. 
These are the six major groups as seen in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. Table 3.6 shows the 
distribution in education for individuals in both pay systems (e.g. straight salary and base 
wage plus bonus). Table 3.7 shows the distribution of those receiving straight salary and 
Table 3.8 the distribution for those receiving base wage plus bonus. 
 
The educational variable is coded into larger categories, focusing on those who have only 
primary and secondary school. The reason for focusing on these forms of educations is that 
these are the educational levels most commonly found for the cohorts working in the trades 
investigated. The educational variable measures the individual’s highest education for the 
year in question. Furthermore, since the variable operates with a sliding scale, it shows the 
highest level of education attained for the specific year investigated. 
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Table 3.6: Educational distribution for those receiving straight salary, base wage and bonus. In three 
selected years. 1983, 1990 and 1996. 
 
  1983   1990   1996  
  N % % female N % % female N % % female 
 Compulsory School  28,2   22,2   17,8  
1 Primary & Secondary School 20029 28,2 36,3 15781 22,2 36,2 10446 17,8 35,0 
 Upper Secondary School  64,3   67,0   67,6  
2 Started 33247 46,7 37,8 29484 41,4 39,0 21786 37,0 37,8 
3 Finished 11065 15,6 25,6 15931 22,4 33,2 15733 26,7 31,9 
4 Extension 1433 2,0 40,4 2253 3,2 36,8 2260  32,6 
 Bachelor  6,6   9,5   13,2  
5 All 4711 6,6 16,3 6783 9,5 25,8 7746 13,2 30,0 
 Masters and higher  0,9   1,3   1,5  
6 All 632 0,9 20,3 928 1,3 23,2 856 1,5 24,3 
Sum  71117 100  71160 100  58827 100  
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Table 3.7: Educational distribution for those receiving straight salary. In three selected years. 1983, 
1990 and 1996. 
 
  1983   1990   1996   
  N % % female N % % female N % % female 
 Compulsory School  28,5   22,5   17,2  
1 Primary & Secondary School 16337 28,5 38,7 13306 22,5 38,2 7135 17,2 36,4 
 Upper Secondary School  64,0   66,8   67,8  
2 Started 26522 46,3 40,3 24510 41,4 41,1 15205 36,7 39,4 
3 Finished 8963 15,7 27,3 13201 22,3 35,0 11186 27,0 33,4 
4 Extension 1174 2,1 41,1 1864 3,1 39,6 1662  33,9 
 Bachelor  6,5   9,4   13,4  
5 All 3738 6,5 17,6 5549 9,4 27,1 5556 13,4 32,0 
 Masters and higher  0,9   1,4   1,6  
6 All 529 0,9 20,6 817 1,4 24,4 648 1,6 24,5 
Sum  57263 100  59247 100  41392 100  
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Table 3.8: Educational distribution for those receiving base wage plus bonus. In three selected years. 
1983, 1990 and 1996. 
 
  1983   1990   1996   
  N % % female N % % female N % % female 
 Compulsory School  27,9   21,5   19,5  
1 Primary & Secondary School 3890 27,9 26,2 2575 21,5 25,6 3411 19,5 32,2 
 Upper Secondary School  64,3   67,2   66,8  
2 Started 6501 46,6 27,3 4926 41,2 28,7 6539 37,4 34,1 
3 Finished 2202 15,8 18,7 2730 22,8 24,2 4547 26,0 28,2 
4 Extension 259 1,9 37,1 389 3,3 23,9 598  29,1 
 Bachelor  7,1   10,3   12,5  
5 All 983 7,1 11,3 1234 10,3 19,7 2190 12,5 25,0 
 Masters and higher  0,7   0,9   1,2  
6 All 103 0,7 16,6 111 0,9 14,4 208 1,2 23,4 
sum  13938 100  11965 100  17493 100  
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Table 3.6 shows that the majority of the employees in the wholesale and retail trades have 
compulsory and upper secondary school education for the selected years. When doing a 
separate analysis for the sub-categories of those receiving straight salary (Table 3.7) and 
those receiving a bonus (Table 3.8), the same tendencies are shown for both groups. The 
wholesale and retail trades are characterised by a low level of education. These findings 
might indicate that education is not of great importance in order to describe differences 
between straight salary and variable wage recipients, as there are relatively few employees 
with a high level of education in the wholesale and retail trade (Table 3.8). Educations 
might, however, have an effect on the amount of bonus received. Thus we need educations 
as a control variable. Regarding the fourth hypothesis (H4) sounding: recipients of variable 
wages are distributed differently in education than the recipients of straight salary, no 
support was found for the hypothesis that bonus receivers have different education 
compared to non-receivers. When analysing the three separate groups (Table 3.6, 3.7 and 
3.8) the weight of education is on compulsory and upper secondary school. It is also worth 
commenting that there are relatively few employees who holds a higher degree of 
education (i.e. bachelors and above). 
 
Experience: An experience variable has been constructed in order to measure the 
correlation between bonus level and experience. Experience is constructed as age minus 
years in school. For each year, this is calculated by the age for the specific year, and the 
highest attained education for that specific year. Finally, seven years were subtracted. The 
equation can be written as follows: (experience = age - education - 7). Experience is then a 
sliding scale, starting at “zero”. The number 7, in the equation, was chosen as this is the 
year one starts school. In the experience variable, “zero” indicates the year the individual 
leaves compulsory school. Beyond that, years of education are also subtracted in the 
experience variable. For each year of work experience, the experience variable rises by 1. 
Experience was chosen as a control variable because it is assumed to be better than age. 
 
Experience Squared: This variable is constructed by multiplying experience, (i.e. 
experience*experience). It is necessary to have variables of this sort as it is reasonable to 
assume that the payoff from experience is not necessarily linear. A significant experience 
squared term will indicate that experience is curvilinear. The payoff increases with 
experience up to a certain point, after which it decreases. In other words, it is unlikely to 
assume that the extra effect of experience has unlimited gains in an individuals career. 
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I provide some average values of the experience variable, in Table 3.9, for three selected 
years. As the table indicate, there is a slightly higher level of experience for the recipients 
of base wage plus a bonus than straight salary. This indicates that the recipients of base 
wage plus a bonus has more experience from work than the recipients of straight salary. 
The level of experience rise for both pay systems towards the end of the period. This might 
be caused by that the individual in the wholesale and retail trade are older in 1996 than 
1983. 
 
Table 3.9: Average experience for recipients of straight salary and 
base wage plus a bonus. In 1983, 1990 and 1996 
Year Straight salary Base wage plus a bonus 
1983 22.2 23.8 
1990 22.9 24.2 
1996 24 26.3 
 
 
 
Levels of analysis 
Here, I will introduce the three levels of analysis: (1) the population level, (2) the 
establishment level and (3) the occupational level. But first I will briefly explain why I did 
not use a fourth possible level of analysis available in these data. 
 
There is also a fourth level available in the data which is commonly used for looking at 
differences for people employed in the same occupation and in the same establishment. For 
the purpose of my analysis, the occupation-establishment (occ-est) level has not been used. 
The reason for not using the occupation-establishment level is due to inconsistency in the 
rationality of how this level would apply to my research questions in reality. The 
interpretation of the occupation-establishment level data, in the case of my analysis, would 
be that employees who work in the same occupation and the same establishment are paid 
on unequal pay systems (i.e. both straight salary and variable wages in the same 
occupation-establishment unit). Two reasons for why this is not likely will be provided: 
Firstly, wages are usually connected to the occupation rather than the establishment; there 
may be variations between establishments, but the main settlements, in terms of wage 
centralised negotiation, are different for different occupational groups. Secondly, the data 
do not provide direct information regarding the agreement between employer and 
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employee. This means that it is not possible to know for sure whether those who are in the 
same occupation-establishment unit, and not receive a bonus, are in fact not promised a 
bonus in the first place. The wage for those who is “promised” a bonus would then be 
lower than it otherwise should as they are only paid the base wage component and not the 
bonus component. The whole idea behind a bonus is to provide incentives so that 
employees will perform better. It is of course not claimed that all employees who engage in 
such a system will reach the target rate of the system in which they are employed. Thus, 
there is the possibility of having a contract paying a variable wage, but not a bonus every 
year. However, there have been studies which have found differences in occupation-
establishment units in terms of pay systems. One such study was done in a wide array of 
industries in Norway (Petersen & Snartland, 2004) and another study was done in Finland 
(Meyersson-Milgrom, Petersen & Aspelund, 2002). 
 
Population Level 
Analyses done at the population level account for all individuals across the data set. At the 
population level no information is provided about which occupation or establishment 
individuals work in. Each individual is compared to other individuals in the general 
population. A separate analysis for the various wage components and straight salary will be 
carried out. 
 
Establishment Level 
The establishment level is a grouping variable for establishments. The grouping variable 
allows controlling for the establishment in which the employee works. As shown in Table 
3.10, the number of establishments where a variable wage component bonus is found 
increases over the years. A bonus is thus becoming more often represented in the data as 
the years are analysed. In 1983, only 21% of the companies were registered using bonus. 
The number of establishments providing an output-based wage system was fairly stable in 
the period of 1983 to 1992. In 1993, however, there was a sudden increase in the number 
of establishments offering an output-related pay system. In 1993 to 1996 the number of 
establishments, where a bonus is found, increases by 9%. This is in contrast to the period 
of 1983 to 1992, where the increase is a mere 1%. One possible explanation for this much 
more rapid growth after 1993 might be the implementation of a new policy for the period – 
the Solidarity Alternative (see Chapter Two). As these policies opted for moderate wage 
growth, there may have been incentives created for differentiating wages by the use of a 
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bonus in some groups and not in others. This might imply that employers took a different 
course, in terms of wage levels, than the intended effect of the policy. Note that there is 
data loss for the years of 1993, 1994 and 1996 as described earlier. 
 
Table 3.10: Total number of companies by year. 
 
Year All Establishments 
Bonus 
Establishments 
% Bonus 
Establishment 
1983 14 102 2963 21 
1984 13 897 2951 21 
1985 13 865 2904 21 
1986 13634 2763 20 
1987 13 867 2647 19 
1988 13 401 2706 20 
1989 13 506 2620 19 
1990 10 434 2270 22 
1991 10 326 2339 23 
1992 10 786 2408 22 
1993 5488 1413 26 
1994 5959 1479 25 
1995 10 870 3194 29 
1996 8619 2681 33 
 
 
The Occupational Level 
The occupational level grouping variable controls for the occupational group in which the 
employee works. There are a total of 104 unique occupations, ranging from 90 to 94 each 
year. As Table 3.11 shows, almost all occupations contain at least one or more 
observations where individuals receive the variable wage component, i.e. a bonus. All 104 
groups were analysed individually although it might seem reasonable to aggregate the 
occupational variable, which would have meant creating smaller groups. The reason for not 
doing so is that previous research shows the same effect for analysing with all groups in 
contrast to dummy variables for larger groups of occupation (Petersen, Snartland, Becken 
& Olsen, 1997). 
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Table 3.11: Total number of occupations by year 
 
Year 
All 
Occupations 
Bonus 
Occupations
Share Bonus Occupations 
(%) 
1983 90 87 97  
1984 90 87 97  
1985 91 88 97  
1986 90 86 96  
1987 93 89 96  
1988 93 90 97  
1989 92 89 97  
1990 93 91 98  
1991 93 88 95  
1992 93 88 95  
1993 93 90 97  
1994 93 90 97  
1995 93 93 100  
1996 94 92 98  
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In this section an elaboration on panel data and explanation of the methodology used to 
obtain the results reported in Chapter Four are presented. 
 
Analysing Panel Data 
Here, I will elaborate on panel data, how they are structured and why panel data are 
especially well suited for a comparison of wages. Panel data, also referred to in the 
literature as longitudinal or cross-sectional time series data describes multiple levels (i.e. 
individuals, firms and occupation units) over time, where each unit is observed for one or 
more points in time. Therefore, observations in panel data involve two dimensions, cross-
sectional (i.e. individual observations) and time series dimensions (i.e. multiple 
observation years) (Hsiao, 2003). Petersen (2004) provides a thorough introduction to the 
subject: 
 
Panel data arise from a variety of processes, including quarterly data on economic 
results, bi-annual election data, and marital life histories. Their central feature 
is that one records at regular intervals the state each individual in the panel 
occupies, with some units observed at two or more points in time (Petersen, 
2004a:331).  
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Cross-sectional information lets us describe differences between individuals. Time series 
information, or within-subject estimations, gives us information regarding individual 
variation over time. The data are unique in the way they are structured, since they allow us 
to follow units over time. Our data is, however, unbalanced, meaning that each unit is not 
necessarily observed for more than one year, due to natural variations in the labour market 
as, for instance, people leaving or entering the wholesale and retail trades, it would give a 
biased impression of the selection if one were to analyse only those who stayed in the 
wholesale and retail trade for the whole time-period. The unbalanced nature of the data 
does not mean our estimates will become less valuable. In fact, panel data allows us to 
control the dependent variable even for unobserved heterogeneity, when heterogeneity is 
constant over time. This is also referred to fixed effect17 analysis.  
 
To sum up, panel studies are “the culmination of a trend that dates back to the 1960s and 
has quickened over the last two decades” (Halaby, 2004:507). When analysing such data 
structures, we have a unique opportunity to do both cross-sectional and time-series 
estimations. Especially when looking at variations in a large-scale study, panel data 
provides unique analyses across all levels of analysis. 
 
Model Description 
Here I will elaborate on our models of analysis. There are three main models described 
here; ordinary least square (OLS) and percentiles. Also, fixed effects analysis will be 
explained and the equation used when analysing with fixed effect models can be viewed as 
an extension of the equation for the OLS model.  
 
Ordinary Least Square Regression Models 
OLS regression models are the method used in this study to analyse differences in wage 
components. For instance, the question is asked whether regression will allow us to isolate 
the effect of bonus on base wage. The review of previous research shows that most 
estimates on wages are done using OLS. In addition I will extend the OLS analysis to 
include fixed effect models analysing at the establishment and occupational level in 
addition to the population level. The equation of fixed effect models will therefore be 
                                                 
17 Fixed effect models will be introduced later in this chapter. 
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introduced in this Section. However, the fixed effect approach will be discussed later in 
this Chapter under the Section fixed effect versus random effects. 
 
 
This thesis will provide estimates on wages and wage differentials using both cross 
sectional and time series analyses. In the below models lnWi,t   is the dependent variable 
(i.e. the four different specification of hourly wages) observed for individual i =(1…,N) at 
time t= (1983-1996). The vector of the coefficients is β, xit  is a vector of the measured 
variable and αi is the individual effect. є i,t  is the error term. I will use three different 
specifications of this equation, one for each level of analysis. The first model is used at the 
population level, the second at the establishment level and the third at the occupational 
level: 
 
                      
              (1)        lnW i,t = xitβ + αi +є i,t                    
         
              (2)        lnW i,t = xitβ +  αi + eη +є i,t         
      
              (3)        lnW i,t = xitβ + αi + oη +є i,t        
 
eη  and oη  are vectors of parameters capturing fixed effects of establishment and 
occupational units. In equation (2) and (3), the error term є i,t includes a dummy variable  xit 
for each person i and then estimates the effect of lnW i,t,. For each level of analysis, the 
upper level variable is set to the level in which the investigations are done. For example, 
when investigating employees who work in the same establishment, the establishment 
variable will be the upper level variable sorting the groups of establishments, i.e. it is 
possible to measure the within-establishment effect on individual wages. Each 
establishment or occupational group is then represented in the fixed effect models by 
dummy variables, reporting the average values within occupations or establishments. 
Control variables for education, experience and experience squared has also been 
modelled. However, since my main concern is the differences for variable wage receivers 
and straight salary, coefficients for control variables is not reported. 
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In addition, a significance test will be implemented in order to test whether there are 
significant differences and how large the differences are between straight salary and 
variable wages (i.e. straight salary*variable, where variable is a dummy capturing the 
effect of the recipients of variable wages compared to recipients of a straight salary) at the 
occupational level (Table 4.8), and between men and women at all levels of analysis (Table 
4.10). 
 
Interpretation of regression models 
First, since logistic regression is used for the purpose of most of the analysis, the constant 
does not give any meaning in logistic regression models. I will explain what the constant 
refers to, but the coefficient for the constant will not be reported. Second, results from 
logistic regression can in many cases be interpreted as a percentage increase in the 
dependent variable for each level of increase of the independent variable. The percentage 
increase is found by the following formula: coefficient * 100. If the coefficient is above 
0.15, the formula can give an incorrect interpretation of the estimates (Petersen, 2004b). A 
better formula to give correct estimates for coefficients above 0.15 is: 100[exp(b)-1]. The 
interpretation is, however, different for dummy variables. In order to interpret the dummy-
variables correctly, it is necessary to use the exp(b) formula (Ringdal, 2001:421). The 
formula is not used on all tables in this thesis. For some cases it is sufficient to look at the 
size of the coefficients in comparison to others. However, when results are discussed in 
percent, or percentage points, such transformations are made when necessary to the 
substantial interpretation. 
 
Percentiles 
Percentiles are well established when comparing wage differentials among groups (Barth, 
Schöne & Torp, 2004). A percentile is the value of a variable below which an observation 
is found. An example is provided by measuring the hourly bonus received by those in the 
lower 10%, extracted from the total observation in the data (i.e. 0-100 %). When including 
this in the time-variant analyses, it will allow us to say something about the development 
of each percentile measured, providing us with information regarding hypothesis (H8): 
Relative differences in the bonus component are equal among the variable wage receivers 
over time. I will illustrate the range from 10 to 90 percentiles of bonus receivers. This will 
give especially good indications of differences between the low and high bonus receiver 
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groups. The 90/10 model will show the distribution of the upper 10% compared to the 
lower 10% over the time periods, thus providing us with a measurement of within-year 
estimates for the distribution ratio between, for instance, the high and low receiver 
percentiles in the population. More specifically, I will here use percentiles to see how the 
development of the distribution in various percentiles has changed. 
 
Percentiles will also be used in the assessment of analysing risk. I will analyse the 
distribution of employees in output-based reward systems earning higher hourly wages 
than the lowest 10 percentile and the average percentile (i.e. percentile 50). 
 
Fixed effects versus random effects 
In order to better understand why fixed effect analyses are used in this thesis, an 
explanations of both fixed effects- and random effect models will be introduced. Random 
and fixed models are used frequently in the hierarchical linear modelling literature 
(Petersen, 2004a; Hsiao, 2003). The models are especially important when analysing panel 
data. Random effects are also often referred to as “variance component” models. The 
distinction between these two models is confusing and used in a wide spectrum of 
modelling within social sciences. This is also why random and fixed models are addressed 
here. A way to determine whether to do a fixed or a random effect analysis is by analysing 
the coefficients by a Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimated by the random effect estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed 
effect estimator. If the coefficients estimated are not significant (P-value larger than 0.05), 
one can safely use random effects. However, if the coefficients estimated are significant, 
only fixed effect analysis can be used. For the purpose of this thesis, a Hausman test has 
been performed, and found some of the models to be significant. Thus, fixed effect models 
are better to analyse on the models in this thesis. One possible limitation to only using a 
fixed effect model and not a random effect model can be if the researcher wishes to go 
beyond available data and generalise to a larger part of society, a random effect analysis 
might be applied, as the random effect analysis draws on random choice from the data. 
However, since this model draws on random choices, it is also less powerful than the fixed 
effect model. As the data used in this thesis provide extensive information in the retail and 
wholesale trades there is no need to generalise in order to give estimates that describes the 
wholesale and retail trade sufficiently. 
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For the articles reviewed in this thesis, fixed effects are used more commonly when 
analysing wages. A fixed effect analysis can be used when one wants to look at the effect 
of different bonus levels (i.e. low, medium, high), controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, when heterogeneity is constant over time. A typical example of a time 
constant variable can be the year, the region or the size of a firm. When analysing at 
multiple levels, the researcher is then able to see what the effects are in the data at various 
level of analysis such as the establishment and occupational level. The fixed effect model 
controls for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time (i.e. 
gender and region). By implementing dummy variables for establishment and occupational 
units, the models are able to describe variance within the units specified. If one for instance 
is analysing at the occupational level, the dummies implemented by the model will group 
the different occupational units estimating the effect within the occupation units. One is 
then able to compare, for instance, wage differential between recipients of variable wage 
and recipients of straight salary at the occupational controlling of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
Why have different estimators? 
Several models, reporting different estimators, have been introduced; OLS, percentiles and 
the fixed effect model. One might ask what is the purpose of having several estimators? 
Estimates will not become more correct or necessarily better if one estimator is chosen 
over another. The different estimators report on different aspects of the data. Therefore a 
estimator is not necessarily better than the other. When we analyse using OLS, this might 
be appropriate when questions are asked at the population level. However, when we ask 
questions concerning the occupation or establishment level, fixed effect models may be 
better. In other words, the model chosen depends on the research question asked. 
 
3.3 Problems and data limitations 
Here, problems and limitations to our data-analysis will briefly be discussed. In the 
introduction to this Chapter, the problem of data loss was introduced, and this should be 
kept in mind for the result concerning the years in question. Second, the range of the data 
in this study covers a limited number of years. Even though the data studied in this thesis 
range from 1983 to 1996 and can be viewed as exceptionally good, I can not know for sure 
if the development of the bonus is a historical trend, or just the result of seasonal 
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adjustments for longer time periods. Further, the way the analysis is constructed might 
draw a different picture now, compared to the situation if variables and analysis had been 
constructed differently. 
 
Limitations when using logarithm of wages on development between years 
When transforming wages within a year to logits, the logits respond to the variations 
among the wage level in the fiscal year. In other words, the wages have not been adjusted 
for CPI in the data, and this might cause a concern when analysing multiple years as wages 
do not have any “real value18“ between years. However, if wages are not adjusted for CPI 
before the transformation into logits, the year to year variations will be higher than what is 
actually the case due to differences in real value. This problem can be overcome in two 
ways. First, a denotation can be inserted into the logit transformation, so that for each year 
the logits will be adjusted for CPI. If one is to do an analysis where the development over 
years is what is being analysed, it is necessary to use such a denotation. Second, if a single 
year analysis is done, one can simply transform the wage term to logits for the year in 
question.  
 
If one wishes to compare variations within a year, rather than between years, both 
approaches are fine. An example of such a comparison might be comparing males and 
females within a year, running a logistic regression for several years singling out the effect 
of gender over the years. The females will then be compared to the wage level for each 
year, thus not creating unusually high values, in terms of wages, when not adjusted for 
CPI. 
 
Limitations to analysing bonus 
I am not able to separate the bonus paid under different performance systems. This is partly 
due to how information about wage components is gathered by Statistics Norway, and 
partly to the way reports are made by establishments. The value creation in the firm is not 
observable. As a consequence it is not possible to observe the actual effect bonuses have 
on the firm performance. Second, in these data there is no distinction made between 
individual or team performance, profit sharing and executive bonus. However, as I am 
looking at the retail and wholesale trades, I can assume that sales commission will be a 
significant part of our data. Third, categories of who receives a bonus and who does not are 
                                                 
18 By real value, I here refer to adjusted CPI numbers. 
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based on payments made in that year. It could be desirable to have information regarding 
the agreement between employer and employee, as this would tell us whether it is common 
to have an agreement where a bonus is likely to be received by the employee, but for some 
reason, bonus is not paid. 
 
Difficulties when measuring risk 
Risk can be subjective. The subjective meaning of risk can be dependent on economic 
factors not observable in the data. For instance, a stable personal economy might induce 
some to face higher risk, as those will have limited downside risk of receiving a pay that is 
lower than expected. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis I suggest ways of analysing risk in the data of this study. 
These methods should be looked upon as a grounded theory approach, suggesting how to 
think and analyse risk. There might, however, be several other methods and approaches to 
analysing risk. Especially qualitative methods and collecting data regarding attitudes 
towards work should be regarded as important when investigating these matters. 
 
Omitted variable bias 
For two of the analyses carried out there is a risk of omitted variable bias. Omitted variable 
bias might be encountered if the “right” variable is not included in the analysis. When 
analysing regions and firm size, I am omitting the region with the highest wages and the 
establishments with the largest number of employees. The results might therefore give a 
biased impression. However, this is a general statistical problem and not a particular 
problem for the data used in this thesis. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have elaborated on the data and methodology. I have described levels of 
analysis and variables and how the variables have been constructed to do the analysis.  
 
I have found that the proportion of people being paid a straight salary is much greater than 
the proportion of workers receiving variable pay. One out of five workers receives a bonus. 
Further, gender differences also seem to play an important role. Education, on the other 
hand, does not seem to be so important for the bonus aspect. This suggests that when 
analysing variable wage components, ways of analysis and thinking about the issues might 
deviate from ordinary wage studies. The reasons for this might be a high level of individual 
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negotiation, variations in individual performance (as pay-for-performance suggest), 
employer motivation for designing such output-related contracts and the fact that straight 
salary and variable wages are likely to have different purposes due to deviance in their 
“motivus”, or how the wage components structure incentive behaviour for both individuals 
and organisations. 
 
In Chapter Four, I will present the main analysis.  
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4 Analysis 
This chapter presents the analysis. Its main purpose is to discuss the characteristics of the 
bonus receivers and discuss what ratio of the total outcome of the employee the bonus 
accounts for on an hourly basis. Table 4.1 will also provide the average monthly bonus 
payments for employees. Here, the effect of variables on the different pays systems will be 
analysed. 
 
Firstly, I will illustrate the differences between payment systems through the use of figures 
and tables, emphasising the average monthly bonus and the bonus share of hourly wages 
for the period of 1983-1996. Secondly, I will do ordinary least square (OLS) regressions on 
the logarithm of the payment systems. Thirdly, I will do fixed effect analysis controlling 
establishment and occupational level data for variations in various firm size and regional 
differences. Finally, I analyse the difference in pay for base wage plus a bonus receivers 
when compared to straight salary at population, establishment and occupational levels. 
 
This chapter is organised based on the two research themes as introduced in Chapter 1: (1) 
the effect of bonuses on wage levels; and (2) the individual characteristics of bonus 
receivers. In addition, this chapter will examine the first theme in detail, through a 
discussion of the risk aspect of receiving variable wages compared to straight salary; are 
employees rewarded for risk? 
 
4.1 The effect of bonus on wage levels  
In this section I will investigate how much the bonus component is increasing in size and 
how large the increase is in share of output-based employee wages versus non output-
based employee wages in the wholesale and retail trade.  
 
Bonus development 
In Figure 4.1 the development of the bonus size and the number of individuals on these 
payment schemes are compared over time. Between 1983 and 1996, an increasing number 
of people received bonus. The average size of bonuses paid, measured on a monthly basis, 
has also increased during the same period. 
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Figure 4.1: Share of fulltime employees receiving bonus (gray 
bars, measured as percent of the total number of employees in the 
trades) and average monthly bonus payment (black line, measured as 
NOK).  
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Note: The monthly bonus is measured in NOK. The value is converted 
to 1990 prices for all years. The consumer price index is based on 
numbers from SSB regarding yearly price increase. 1983-1990 = 51,9 
% price increase, and 1990-1996 = 13,9 % price increase. 
 
In Figure 4.1, the grey bars indicate the percentage of the employees in the wholesale and 
retail trade that received a bonus for the specific years. There are large variations among 
the years. For the period 1983-1989, the number of people diminishes until 1987. After 
1987, the numbers rise again until 1989. In 1990, the number of people is lower than the 
year before. However, for each year after 1990, the number of employees receiving a 
variable wage rises, with the exception of 1994. More people are receiving a bonus at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. Answering our fifth hypothesis (H5), investigating 
whether the number of employees receiving variable wages increases over time, Figure 4.1 
shows that this hypothesis is supported. The number of employees, measured as a share of 
the total number of employees in the wholesale and retail trades, shows yearly variations 
and increases over time. 
 
The black line indicates the monthly bonus payment measured in NOK. Base wage is 
excluded. The monthly bonus payment varies from 1590 NOK in 1983 to 1827 NOK in 
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1996, measured in 1990 NOK. This is a 13% increase. From 1989 to 1993, the largest 
growth in average monthly bonus payments is detected. Two important factors of receiving 
bonuses are based on profit sharing and sales commission. Both factors are dependent on 
the general economic development. Moreover, the economic development is dependent on 
finance politics (i.e. governmental spending for stabilising economic conjunctures). Profit 
sharing is dependent on the sum available for sharing (i.e. firm profit) and sales 
commission is dependent on the willingness of customer to buy merchandise (i.e. random 
factors). Therefore, bonuses can also partly be dependent on the gross domestic product 
(GDP). In 1988 and 1989 the level of monthly bonus is decreasing indicating the effect of 
the “wage ceiling” (Longva & Høgsnes, 2001). The period of 1990-93 is characterised by 
an expansive finance politic in Norway, while in the period of 1994-96 the finance politics 
was non-expansive, and the effect of monthly bonus payments vary according to the policy 
changes. In addition, to decrease inflation in Norway was one of the main aims of the 
Employment Commission Board of 1992 (Johansen & Eika, 2000), indicating that wage 
growth should be lower than the previous period. However, for the bonus component to be 
affected, it is not necessarily sufficient with a policy change as the bonus component also 
is dependent on the effort spent by employees and the economic performance of the firm. 
From our theoretical framework, we have also discussed that employers have an interest in 
keeping inflation low (Bowman, 2002). Thus it is likely to assume that firm revenue 
dropped in the same period and employer motivation to decrease the wage growth was 
present. In other words, the drop in monthly bonus payments for the periods is not likely 
due to less effort spent producing by employees, or solely on policy changes, but 
employers’ persistence for regulating these wage levels. What regulates the level of bonus 
might thus be consistent with three factors; (1) policy change, (2) employer motivation for 
setting wage levels (i.e. firm revenue) and (3) employee effort. 
 
The variations in average monthly bonus and percentage of employees receiving a bonus 
seem to vary proportionally. As more people are receivers, the average monthly bonus 
received decreases.  
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Descriptive statistics for the wage components  
Table 4.1 gives the mean and standard deviation of each of the wage components. The 
table is based on hourly earnings. Workers in output-related wage systems earned 106.7 
NOK per hour in 1983. In the table below I can see that they had a growth in hourly wages 
of 20.6% including both base wage and variable wages. Thus, the ones receiving straight 
salary had a higher hourly wage growth (26.9%) in the time-period. Yet, they also had a 
comparatively lower hourly wage in total. Also interesting to note, when looking at the 
bonus component separately from base wage (column 2 and 3), I also find that the variable 
wage has a higher percentage growth per hour compared to base wage.  
 
The standard deviation of base wage plus a bonus is somewhat higher than for straight 
salary, 21.4 vs. 16.7 in 1983 and 45.1 vs. 33.8 in 1996, reflecting higher wage dispersion 
among the output-related payment systems compared to the non-output related payment 
systems. An interesting observation is the standard deviation of the bonus wage component 
(Table 4.1, column 3). Here, the standard deviation is high compared to the mean hourly 
bonus, indicating that the distribution of bonuses has a higher variance than the remaining 
wage components. This supports the first hypothesis (H1): employees who receive a base 
wage plus bonus have higher hourly pay than employees on straight salary. Receivers of 
base wage plus a bonus have higher hourly pay compared to straight salary receivers in the 
data. However, the standard deviation is also large, indicating a higher level of uncertainty 
for the wage components when compared to straight salary. 
 
For the purpose of comparing the share of bonus measured as percent of the hourly pay 
with the annual wage growth, as discussed in Chapter Two, we may also calculate the 
mean annual wage growth for the two pay systems. For straight salary, when can divided 
the annual wage growth by years ob observation in order to get a measure on the average 
annual wage growth for the period; for recipients of straight salary (26.9/14) 1.9%,  and for 
variable wages (20.6/14) 1.5%, adjusted for CPI (1996 prices). As already elaborated on, 
Hansen and Skoglund (2003) found for the period of 1990-2002, the annual wage growth 
in Norway was 2.1% when adjusted for CPI. 
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Table 4.1: Hourly wage and wage component distribution of 1) 
Straight salary, 2) Base wage, 3) Bonus and 4) Base salary plus 
bonus, in hourly wages, for two selected years. 1983 and 1996. 
Adjusted for CPI (1996 prices) 
 
 1   2   3   4   
Year 1983 1996 Change (%) 1983 1996
Change 
(%) 1983 1996
Change 
(%) 1983 1996 
Change 
(%) 
Mean 90,6 115 26,9 96,7 116,1 20,1 10,2 12,6 23,5 106,7 128,7 20,6 
S.D. 16,7 33,8  18,2 35  10,1 20,5  21,4 45,1  
N 57260 41381  13857 17446  13857 17446  13857 17446  
 
Table 4.2 below sums up the differences between 1) straight salary and base wage and 2) 
straight salary and base wage plus a bonus. The base wage component was 6.7% higher 
than straight salary in 1983 and 1% higher than straight salary in 1996. In contrast, the base 
wage plus a bonus was 17.8% higher in 1983 and 11.9% higher in 1996 than straight 
salary. As a result, base wage and straight salary has become more similar to each other 
over the years. The same trend is the case for base wage plus a bonus and straight salary. 
However, here the differences are larger and the bonus component contributes to the 
differences. In other words, there is a substantial pay off from receiving a bonus as 
compared to a straight salary. 
 
There is support for the idea that straight salary and base wage have developed to become 
more similar over the years. The variation in mean differences between straight salary and 
base wage plus a bonus can largely be explained by the bonus wage component alone and 
not base wage. As the differentials between straight salary and base wage plus a bonus 
have become more similar, the wage gains for straight salary have had a higher growth rate 
than for base wages. The most reasonable explanation for the development was mentioned 
in Chapter Two. Wages are negotiated based on raise in NOK, and not in percentage. 
Moreover, the fact that wage increase is given as NOK can be one factor leading to a 
higher growth rate in straight salary as compared to variable wages. As straight salary 
receivers have lower mean wages compare to variable wage receivers, this development 
between straight salary and base wage plus a bonus is a fine example of how moderate 
wage growth influence the relationship where relative wages grow more for the lower 
income groups.  
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Table 4.2: Differences in development between 1) straight salary 
and base wage 2) straight salary and base wage plus bonus. 1983 
and 1996. 
Year 1 2 
1983 6.7 % 17.8 % 
1996 1 % 11.9 % 
Note: Based on table 4.1. Calculations compare hourly wage of 
straight salary and base wage (column 1) for 1983 and 1996 and 
compare straight salary and base wage plus a bonus (column 2) for 
1983 and 1996. 
 
I have now seen that the average monthly bonus payments have increased and that there is 
an increase in number of receivers of bonuses in the wholesale and retail trades. Next, I 
will investigate whether the significance of the bonus has increased in terms of hourly 
salary for the employees paid on an output based payment system. 
 
How much does bonus account for of the monthly income? 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the effect of the bonus on the hourly wage for the recipients of 
bonuses from 1983 to 1996. When comparing 1983 to 1996, there is a one percentage point 
increase in the significance of the bonus as part of the hourly earnings.  
 
The yearly development of the bonus varies between 9.5 % (Figure, 4.2: year 1983) to 10.8 
% (Figure, 4.2: year 1991) measured on the hourly wage for the employees with a bonus. 
Within this range, the level of bonus is stable when measuring hourly bonus income. It can 
be concluded that the growth of the bonus is proportional to the growth of base wage. 
Thus, there are only small indications of the positive development of the bonus, measured 
on total wages, for the employees receiving bonus. In our model (as described in Figure 
4.2), the average is accounted for. Considering a bonus to be about 10% of the hourly 
wage, this is rather high when considering the financial flexibility of a firm. In chapter two 
we defined a reasonable level of wage growth to be about 4% each year and that the 4% 
level can be regarded as a level identifying a medium level of financial flexibility. Thus, 
when the level is 10% in the data, financial flexibility is high in the wholesale and retail 
trade. 
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Figure 4.2: Average hourly bonus; share measured in percentage of 
hourly pay for the ones whom receive bonus in wholesale and 
retail. 1983 – 1996 
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There are, however, large variations between groups of variable wage receivers, and so 
analyses of percentiles at the population level will be done next. 
 
High bonus pay for a declining group 
In the data, only 19.2% of the population receives a bonus. If I look further into the group 
of bonus receivers, I find additional differences when comparing the relative differences 
between the ones who received the highest and lowest bonuses in the population within 
years. 
 
In Table 4.3, the ratios of the lowest 10 percentile and the highest 10 percentiles are 
compared. This is referred to as the 90/10 ratio. There is a strong decline in the 90/10 ratio 
over the years, with few exceptions. Indicating a distributional shift among the highest and 
lowest 10 percentiles of the size of the bonus distributed within the group of variable wage 
workers over the years. In 1983, the 90/10 rate was 63.7%, in 1995 52.9% while 39% in 
1996. This indicates a shift where the low receiver groups receive a higher bonus, 
increasing by year, relative to those who received a high bonus in 1983. In 1986, there is a 
particularly high drop in the 90/10 percentile compared to the previous and following year. 
The reason for this is most likely due to the economic crisis that occurred that year. It is 
likely to assume that many of the bonuses was based on combined agreements, by which 
the employee share in profit on the basis of how well the company is doing, were affected 
by the crisis in 1986. It is then observable how the economic development can influence a 
variable wage. 
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Table 4.3: Average monthly bonus payments distributed between two 
percentiles; p10 and p90. 1983 to 1996 
Year 90/10 rate 
1983 63,7 
1984 66,4 
1985 62,5 
1986 44,3 
1987 50,3 
1988 51,7 
1989 51,3 
1990 58,6 
1991 50,1 
1992 42,9 
1993 36,7 
1994 33,4 
1995 52,9 
1996 39,0 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4, represents all full-time employees receiving a bonus in two selected years; 1983 
and 1996. Further, the table shows the size of various average hourly bonus payments in 
nine percentiles. The distributions on percentiles indicate size of the bonus distributed on 
nine bonus receiver groups (i.e. percentile 1-9). For instance, in 1983 0.9% of the total 
bonus was distributed among the 10 percentiles receiving less than 10% of the total amount 
of bonuses paid for that year in the retail and wholesale trade. It is important to note that 
the estimates are relative and only give meaning when compared to other ratios. The 
employees earning the highest hourly bonus have declined the most (i.e. percentile nine). 
Some of the decline in the top 10 percentiles is due to an increase in the groups receiving 
the lowest amount of hourly bonus. Percentiles 2-4 are the ones with the highest gains 
when comparing the two periods. In other words, the size of the bonus is becoming 
stronger throughout the whole population over the years. Moreover, the increase can be 
viewed as strengthening of economical incentives. Less bonus are distributed to the highest 
10 percentiles, where the highest 10 percentiles distribute downwards with the highest 
growth in the lower percentiles. This confirms the assumptions from Figure 4.1, thus our 
hypothesis (H8) is not supported, saying relative differences in the bonus component are 
equal among the variable wage receivers over time. In other words, either there is a 
distribution from the higher receiver categories to the lower, or the total amount of bonus 
payment is increasing in the wholesale and retail trade where the employees who receive 
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least in the first place increase their relative position in terms of size of bonus payment 
measured on the hourly wage. It is more likely that the total amount of bonus payments 
increase as the number of employees paid on output related wage systems is increasing in 
share of the population.  
 
Table 4.4: Average hourly bonus pay; nine percentiles. 1983 and 
1996 
 1983 1996 
All fulltime employees receiving bonus   
Percentile 1 0.9 1.3 
Percentile 2 1.4 2.5 
Percentile 3 2.9 3.4 
Percentile 4 4 4.6 
Percentile 5 5.8 6.2 
Percentile 6 8 8.8 
Percentile 7 12.6 12.7 
Percentile 8 20.9 20.7 
Percentile 9 43.5 39.8 
Total 100 100 
 
So far, size of bonus payments and how these are distributed in the wholesale and retail 
trades in the period 1983-1996 has been analysed. Further, analyses of bonus payments and 
the characteristics of the recipient will be analysed.  
 
4.2 Characteristics of bonus recipients  
Our second research question was to discover some characteristics of the group of bonus 
receivers in the data. In particular, this section will investigate how bonuses are distributed 
within trade and among gender, type of firms and geographical differences. Attention will 
also be given to differences between variable wage recipients versus the recipients of 
straight salary and gender differences. First, the gender effect on wage components and 
straight salary is analysed. Second, analyses of differences between wholesale and retail. 
Third, analyses of the effect of size of firm and wages are done. Finally, analyses of 
differences between variable wages versus straight salary when employed in the same 
occupations and in the same region. The two first analyses is done by using OLS, while the 
third applies the fixed effect model on the establishment level and the fourth applies fixed 
effect models on the occupational level. 
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How is bonus distributed between genders?  
Here I will look at the difference in gender for the bonus distribution. First, I will discuss 
the involvement of females in output related pay systems emphasising the yearly 
development. Second, I use ordinary least square models to investigate the difference in 
size of variable wages and straight salary between genders. 
 
The inclusion of females in output related occupations 
In Figure 4.3, the male/female ratio of bonus receivers is shown, measured as a percentage, 
for the years of 1983-1996. The share of female bonus receivers has increased in the 
period. The number of women receiving bonuses compared to men receiving bonuses is 
steadily increasing over the years. While 25 % females received bonuses in 1983, 31 % 
receive bonuses in 1996. In other words, more females are recruited into occupations 
where output related wage systems are used. This may indicate that policies that aim at 
lowering the gender wage gap have had an effect, and in particular after 1993. In recent 
years, several programs19 have been deployed in order to recruit more females into 
occupations where bonuses are used. One of the main arguments behind using bonuses is 
to motivate females into taking jobs that are dominated by males, or traditionally viewed as 
male dominated occupations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 One such program aimed at recruiting females to occupations where there are high wages is FUTURE, 
which is the product of the Finance Sector Union. The ability to receive a bonus is in particular emphasised 
as a characteristics of a high-income occupation by the Finance Sector Union representatives. Employers, for 
instance, the Norwegian School of Economics and Administration (NHH), has focused in particular on 
offering a bonus to females who are recruited into their occupations. In other words, the promise of a bonus 
might be used as an argument to recruit females into occupations that are male dominated. 
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Figure 4.3: Male/Female ratio of bonus receivers in percentage. 
1983 - 1996 
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Is the development in gender differences the same for variable wages and straight salary? 
Here, I will investigate the development and variations of base wage plus a bonus, its 
components and straight salary, and see how they develop over time between males and 
females. As more females are hired into output-related pay systems, the pay difference 
among males and females is increasing, indicating that the occupations females are 
recruited into are not where there are high gains in terms of variable wages. Table 4.5 show 
the results of regression analysis comparing female wages with male wages in four wage 
components: (1) straight salary; (2) base wage; (3) bonus; and (4) base wage plus a bonus. 
 
For the straight salary receivers, the gap between female wages and male wages is 
decreasing (column 1) over the 14 year period. The same trend is observed for females 
being paid base wages. The decrease is, however, smaller when compared to the decline in 
the straight salary component. When investigating the bonus component (column 3), the 
gap between female wages and male wages is not decreasing as much as the other wage 
components, with an exception of the final years (1992-95). In the base wage plus a bonus 
component (column 4), the gap between female wages and male wages is decreasing. The 
decrease is smaller and inequality larger when compared to the straight salary component 
for female ratio. Changes in the base wage plus a bonus component is thus in contrast to 
the one of base wages. In other words, it is the bonus component that ‘slows down’ the 
decrease in the wage gap among sexes for the variable wage component, base wage plus a 
  76
bonus. Here, our third hypothesis (H3) is supported: females receive a significantly lower 
base wage plus bonus than males when controlled for education, experience and 
experience squared. The gender wage gap is larger in base wage plus a bonus than the 
straight salary. What is interesting is that the gender differences in the base wage 
component are in fact lower than gender differences in straight salary. It is the bonus 
component that contributes towards gender inequality in variable wages. Therefore, we ask 
the question: what reasons can explain the gender differences in bonuses? 
 
There are at least two possible explanations important to address in answering this 
question. Firstly, the criteria for receiving a bonus might be better adapted to males than 
females. One reason supporting this claim is that the number of females who are employed 
in occupations where output related wages are paid will be very few compared to males. In 
particular, if the bonus aims at the individual performance, as in contrasts to team-based or 
profit sharing, it is not unlikely that collaboration and sense of unity will be undermined in 
the workplace. In addition, this may affect females in particular, as they are relatively 
few.20 Secondly, wage level is dependent on wage negotiation settlements. For the case of 
Norway, it is common to have both central and local negotiation. From the table below we 
can assume that the central negotiations are quite effective, as the gender wage gap is 
decreasing for straight salary and relatively low for the base wage component compared to 
straight salary. Much of the negotiation for straight salary and base wage is likely to 
happen by tariff agreement at the central level and local level. This also includes the level 
of bonuses, in particularly the provision made from sales. However, when bonuses are 
based on combined agreements there can be much more room for individual based 
negotiations (i.e. negotiations that is not bound by tariff agreements) according to company 
performance. A recent study from Sweden shows that females are poorer negotiators of 
wages than males. In addition, some of the explanation for this is connected to a 
stereotypical conception tied to masculine and feminine characteristics: men are seen as 
good negotiators as they are strong, decisive and self-assertive. Women are seen as bad 
                                                 
20 In an online forum where females discussed their view of a bonus in the workplace, a member had the 
following to say: ‘If the bonus is purely attached to individual effort, the result may be too much competing 
within a department. Some people are selfish and not willing to help others if they only get measured on 
individual effort. This may quickly create a lot of dissatisfaction and a bad working environment!                 
Where I am now, I do not receive bonus, but my salary today is higher than when I was earning bonus. I 
would rather opt for a high base wage and a small bonus, than the other way round. And I would like to have 
a say in what criteria form the basis of the bonus so that I am not measured on unrealistic or purely 
individual targets.’ Source: Online forum discussion in the magazine Kvinneguiden from member ‘Catzy’ 
(Read date 06.11.07). 
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negotiators as they are concessive, emotional and overly focused on relationships. In 
psychology, ‘stereotype threat’ refers to the phenomenon in which groups that are expected 
to do poorly will perform poorly on assignments when based on stereotypical perception 
are expected to do perform less well. This is what the Swedish study confirms in terms of 
male and female differences in terms of outcome of wage negotiation (Gustafsson, 2008). 
Due to stereotypical perceptions females may therefore have a weaker position than males 
when it comes to negotiating these wages with an employer. The characteristics associated 
by the stereotypic perception may also make females less “desirable” in some occupations 
as for instance sales positions where negotiating for terms with customers is a “desirable” 
skill in the occupational category. 
 
In conclusion, the development in variable wages and straight salary is not equal among 
genders. Gender differences in variable wages are increasing, due to the bonus component, 
while gender differences are decreasing for straight salary. Explanations for this might be 
due to the fact that criteria for bonuses better aims males and stereotypical perception of 
gender that disadvantages the females in individual wage negotiations. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Female hourly wage compared to male wages for straight 
salary and in the three wage components. Log hourly wage of; 1) 
Straight Salary, 2) Base Wage, 3) Bonus, 4) Base Salary plus 
bonus. 14 years. Controlled for education, experience and 
experience squared. Coefficients for male, education and 
experience is not reported. 1983 – 1996. 
Year 1 Std.err 2 Std.err 3 Std.err 4 Std.err 
1983 -0,184 0,002 -0,144 0,005 -0,683 0,027 -0,195 0,005 
1984 -0,188 0,002 -0,147 0,005 -0,647 0,027 -0,193 0,005 
1985 -0,191 0,002 -0,145 0,005 -0,640 0,028 -0,193 0,005 
1986 -0,187 0,002 -0,136 0,005 -0,653 0,027 -0,193 0,005 
1987 -0,198 0,002 -0,146 0,005 -0,633 0,027 -0,201 0,005 
1988 -0,196 0,002 -0,141 0,005 -0,634 0,026 -0,199 0,005 
1989 -0,182 0,002 -0,136 0,005 -0,640 0,027 -0,187 0,005 
1990 -0,163 0,002 -0,123 0,005 -0,699 0,028 -0,182 0,005 
1991 -0,156 0,002 -0,109 0,005 -0,664 0,028 -0,168 0,005 
1992 -0,152 0,002 -0,104 0,005 -0,605 0,026 -0,166 0,005 
1993 -0,143 0,002 -0,097 0,006 -0,556 0,031 -0,161 0,006 
1994 -0,138 0,002 -0,097 0,006 -0,560 0,030 -0,157 0,006 
1995 -0,123 0,002 -0,112 0,004 -0,596 0,028 -0,177 0,004 
1996 -0,124 0,002 -0,110 0,004 -0,667 0,022 -0,166 0,004 
Note: N (obs-years) Column 1= 769 478; Column 2, 3 and 4= 183 360 
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How is bonus distributed between the wholesale and retail trade?  
Wage differentials between wholesale and retail are important to emphasise, as it tells us 
something about organisational structure in wholesale and retail. It is not unlikely that the 
average employees in wholesale has more responsibility and therefore also have higher 
wages. It is in wholesale where we find the highest frequency of output-related pay 
schemes, but we do not know if there are significant differences in hourly pay between the 
two trades and between straight salary and variable wage. Moreover, the size of differences 
in pay is what I will look further into here, as it may tell us something about differences in 
incentive structures and how these are allocated between wholesale and retail. In order to 
obtain these results, controls for education and experience will be performed. 
 
Evidence from Table 4.6 shows that wage levels in wholesale is considerably larger than 
for retail. There are considerably more people employed in wholesale than retail who 
receive variable wages. One reason for this is due to the occupations that are performed in 
the two trades. The concept of variable wage aims at enhancing efficiency and 
performance, and it is likely that there are fewer occupations that aim at enhancing 
efficiency and performance in retail. One example of a typical occupation in retail is the 
cashier of a grocery store. Their performance is more dependent on the hours spent at the 
store, than their effort in serving the cash register quickly. A common occupation in 
wholesale is a travelling salesperson. Here, the salesperson is measured by achieving a 
high sales rate, rather than the amount of hours spent trying to sell. Therefore, a wage that 
encourages achieving a higher sales rate is more applicable. The wage levels in wholesale 
might be higher due to occupations that demand for more responsibility and other factors 
such as increasing employee motivation in wholesale.  
 
For straight salary receivers (column 1), the wage gap between the retail and wholesale 
trades is decreasing. The penalty for straight salary receivers in retail is thus decreasing 
compared to straight salary in wholesale.  
 
The opposite is observed for the variable wage component (column 4). Here there is an 
increase in wage differentials among retail and wholesale, where employees in wholesale 
are paid a higher hourly wage. The difference is partly due to increase in the base wage 
component (column 2) and partly due to increase in the bonus component (column 4).  
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What is in particularly interesting is that when comparing straight salary to base wage plus 
a bonus, the differences between wholesale and retail used to be larger for the employees 
who received a straight salary compared to the employees who receive base wage plus a 
bonus. In other words, differences between wholesale and retail used to be lower for the 
employees receiving output based wages when comparing wholesale to retail. The shift 
occurred in 1988, the very same year as the “wage ceiling” was executed. From this 
evidence we may say that the “wage ceiling” had opposite effect on straight salary than for 
the variable wage. The aim of the “wage ceiling” was to reduce wage growth in order to 
compensate for inflation. 
 
Table 4.6: Retail ratio compared to wholesale for straight salary 
and in three wage components. Log hourly wage of; 1) Straight 
Salary, 2) Base Wage, 3) Bonus, 4) Base Salary plus bonus. 
Controlled for education, experience and experience squared. 
Coefficients for male, education and experience is not reported. 
1983-1996.  
Year 1 Std.err 2 Std.err 3 Std.err 4 Std.err 
1983 -0,247 0,002 -0,188 0,005 -0,538 0,025 -0,209 0,005 
1984 -0,258 0,002 -0,192 0,005 -0,574 0,025 -0,216 0,005 
1985 -0,260 0,002 -0,211 0,005 -0,497 0,026 -0,229 0,005 
1986 -0,245 0,002 -0,197 0,005 -0,496 0,026 -0,226 0,005 
1987 -0,236 0,002 -0,198 0,005 -0,397 0,027 -0,221 0,005 
1988 -0,234 0,002 -0,209 0,005 -0,509 0,026 -0,242 0,005 
1989 -0,220 0,002 -0,196 0,005 -0,615 0,027 -0,229 0,006 
1990 -0,212 0,002 -0,198 0,006 -0,582 0,028 -0,226 0,006 
1991 -0,204 0,002 -0,197 0,006 -0,654 0,028 -0,242 0,006 
1992 -0,209 0,002 -0,187 0,005 -0,458 0,027 -0,226 0,006 
1993 -0,203 0,003 -0,163 0,007 -0,423 0,033 -0,213 0,007 
1994 -0,204 0,003 -0,173 0,006 -0,368 0,032 -0,211 0,006 
1995 -0,181 0,002 -0,208 0,004 -0,843 0,022 -0,258 0,005 
1996 -0,182 0,002 -0,216 0,004 -0,671 0,023 -0,248 0,005 
Note: N (obs-years) Column 1= 769 478; Column 2, 3 and 4= 183 360 
 
How are wages allocated at different levels of firm size? 
In order to address the question of the effect of wages on size of firm, fixed effects analysis 
at the firm level will be used. In addition to observe the importance of variable wages and 
size of firm, two periods will be analysed as this will tell us the development in the 
importance and significance over time. The two periods investigated are; (1) 1983-89 and 
(2) 1990-96.  
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Table 4.7 show variations in the size of firm, and how this impacts the hourly pay straight 
salary and the three variable wage components. The various firm size levels are compared 
to large companies (the baseline is firms with more than 50 employees). There are two 
interesting findings in the table. First, when looking at the period of 1983-89 there are a 
linear for straight salary (column 1), base wage (column 2) and base wage plus a bonus 
(column 4). This indicates that larger firms also pay higher salary. Second, when 
comparing the two time periods, the effect from the first period disappears. The various 
sizes of firms have thus become more eligible to pay wages closer to what large companies 
are paying. For straight salary, there is a positive effect working in other sizes of firms than 
large in 1990-96. The differences in size of firm and straight salary is, however, small. 
This suggests that there are only small to no wage gains between different sizes of firms 
for straight salary in the period of 1990-96. For base wage plus a bonus (column 4), the are 
still larger wage gains when employed in large companies compared to small, but there is 
no linear relationship. However, when analysing the bonus wage component (column 3) a 
linear relationship still appear with one exception; firm size 1 and 2 are similar. 
 
Our sixth hypothesis (H6) thus finds partly support; large firms pay higher variable wages 
than firms with few employees. The effect is valid for straight salary and base wage plus a 
bonus in the first period. In the second period the hypothesis only find support for base 
wage plus a bonus. From this I might formulate the question; why does there seem to be a 
shift in the straight salary and base wage, but not in terms of the bonus component over 
time? 
 
From our theoretical framework research supporting that wage levels increase by firm size 
was discussed. The reason why base wage plus a bonus and the bonus component in 
particular, differs from straight salary in the second period is perhaps due to that bonuses 
differ somewhat from straight salaries and base wages; one differences is that variable 
wages seem to be influenced by central negotiations to a lesser extend than straight salary.  
It is assumed that employers will control the local wage development in the private sector. 
And the control excesses by the employer can arguably be higher for variable wages than 
straight salary as the outcome of variable wage is more a result of direct relationship 
between the employer and employee. Moreover, variable wages differs from straight salary 
between the two periods as the relationship of financial flexibility of large firms and 
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financial flexibility for small firms does not change. Indicating that larger firms are 
dependent on a higher degree of flexibility than small firms. 
 
Table 4.7: The within effect of firm size on the logarithm of 
hourly wage for straight salary and in three wage components. 1) 
Straight salary, 2) base wage, 3) bonus, 4) base wage plus a 
bonus. Two periods; 1983-1989 and 1990-1996. Establishment fixed 
effects. Standard error in brackets.  
 1983-1989  1990-1996 
 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
Firm Size*          
1 -0,131 -0,242 -0,258 -0,254  0,044 -0,032** -0,217 -0,055 
 (0,005) (0,011) (0,043) (0,011)  (0,005) (0,011) (0,048) (0,011)
2 -0,128 -0,231 -0,281 -0,243  0,026 -0,042 -0,218 -0,064 
 (0,005) (0,010) (0,038) (0,010)  (0,004) (0,009) (0,041) (0,010)
3 -0,100 -0,194 -0,286 -0,208  0,022 -0,011NF -0,115** -0,028 
 (0,005) (0,009) (0,033) (0,009)  (0,004) (0,008) (0,035) (0,008)
4 -0,073 -0,144 -0,226 -0,154  0,019 -0,000NF -0,080** -,009NF
 (0,004) (0,007) (0,026) (0,007)  (0,003) (0,006) (0,027) (0,006)
          
sigma_u 0,256 0,289 1,314 0,300  0,194 0,227 1,284 0,234 
sigma_e 0,251 0,242 0,908 0,251  0,215 0,218 0,976 0,225 
rho 0,509 0,588 0,677 0,588  0,448 0,521 0,634 0,519 
N (establishment) 23623 6623 6623 6623  17103 6349 6349 6349 
Note: *Omitted variable is firm size 5 where employees>50. 
**Significant at 5% level. NF= not significant. N=246 196, N (obs-
years)=954 838. 
 
 
Is there a wage gain for output-related pay systems versus non-output pay systems 
when employed in the same occupation and in the same region? 
Table 4.8 shows occupational level variations. The table shows variations from the 
baseline category, for two periods (1983-89 and 1990-96) for the workers receiving 
straight salary (Panel A) and the employees receiving variable wages (Panel B). The 
baseline category is eastern part of Norway (region 1). The bonus/penalty for the workers 
who receive variable wages is shown by a significance test (i.e. whether variable wage is 
significantly different from straight salary or not when working in the same occupation and 
in the same region) in Panel B.  
 
The table is interpreted as follows; for straight salary receivers, Panel A, region 2 has 9.3% 
lower hourly wages than the baseline category (eastern region) in 1983 to 1989. In 1990 to 
1996, the differences are 2.5%. The coefficients indicate the difference in straight salary 
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received for that specific region, when compared to the baseline category. The gain for the 
variable wage receivers (Panel B) is an additional 1% in region 2 for the same period when 
employed in the same occupation. Differences are rather small. In the second period (1990-
96), there are no differences between straight salary and variable wages in region 2. 
 
For the remaining regions, clearly the baseline category is where hourly wages are higher. 
Wages seem to be particularly increasing in region 5 (northern parts) between the two 
periods. The bonus/penalty for the variable wage receivers is significantly different for 
many regions. One interesting observation is that in region 3 (1990-96) and region 5 
(1983-89 and 1990-96) there is a penalty for the variable wage receiver, while for the 
remaining region there is a positive effect. The reason for this would require further 
research as there is not an obvious interpretation. 
 
Substantively, the initial differential in wages between regions is expected because of two 
reasons. Firstly, low inequality in wage levels within a region contribute towards balance 
in the internal labour market. Different regions can experience forms of economic shock. 
Economic shock can be both positive (i.e. the discovery of natural resources) and negative 
(i.e. drop in value of exported merchandise). The balance in the internal labour market for 
various regions is believed to contain the levels of unemployment rates. Under such 
circumstances, the wage flexibility between regions contributes towards development in 
the unemployment rates and keeping the unemployment rates low. In the long run, wage 
flexibility between regions is connected to the establishment of firms and the number of 
people living in that region. If the cost of workers is low in a region, one can in the long 
run expect more firms to establish in the area as employees are cheaper than other regions. 
Further, when more firms are established the competition will increase between firms for 
employees and increase wages. Moreover, when wages increase in a region, more people 
would want to live there because of higher wages. Secondly, differences between regions, 
in terms of pay, are because there is difference in living expenses between regions (Barth 
& Dale-Olsen, 2003:108).  
 
Our seventh hypothesis (H7) thus only finds partly support, saying that employees 
receiving base wage plus bonus earn higher wages compared with those who receive 
straight salary when working in the same occupation, and in the same region. When 
testing the assumption of variable wages being significantly higher when compared to 
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straight salary for employees in the same region, there is little to no support for the 
assumption is found; the variable wage levels show little discrepancy from the general 
wage level for that region 
 
Table 4.8: The within occupational effect of regional difference 
in occupations on the logarithm of hourly wage in two wage 
formations: 1) Straight Salary, 2) Base Salary plus bonus. And in 
two time periods; 1983-1989 and 1990-1996. Occupation fixed effect 
analysis. Standard error in brackets.  
 
 1983-1989  1990-1996  
Panel A: Straight Salary     
    
Region 2 -0,093 
 
-0,025  
 (0,001)  (0,001)  
Region 3 -0,074  -0,069  
 (0,001)  (0,001)  
Region 4 -0,021  -0,088  
 (0,001)  (0,001)  
Region 5 -0,191  -0,027  
 (0,002)  (0,002)  
     
Variable Wage 0,082  0,096  
 (0,001) (0,001)  
Panel B: Penalty/Bonus  
 
  
for variable wages     
Region 2 0,010  0,001 NF 
 (0,002)  (0,002)  
Region 3       0,001 NF  -0,017  
 (0,002)  (0,002)  
Region 4      0,002 NF  0,012  
 (0,003)  (0,002)  
Region 5 -0,024  -0,041  
 (0,005)  (0,004)  
     
sigma_u 0,241  0,210  
sigma_e 0,234  0,183  
Rho 0,516  0,568  
Note: Omitted variable is region 1: eastern part of Norway. NF= 
not significant at 5% level. N=246 196, N (obs-years)=954 838. 
 
4.3 Are employees rewarded for risk? 
Our theoretical framework shows that risk and pay is correlated, and we have seen that 
there are higher average wages for the ones paid on output-related pays systems. Here, the 
distribution for the size of wage for variable wage- and straight salary recipients will be 
further addressed through looking at how many of the employees are distributed lower than 
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the average for the population segment (i.e. percentile distribution). Second, analysis of the 
gain for males and females at the population, establishment and occupational level will be 
done for two time periods; (1) 1983-89 and (2) 1990-96. 
 
Pay systems and distribution on pay levels 
In Table 4.9, panel A we see that 97.6% have higher hourly earnings of the workers in the 
output-related pay systems in the period of 1983-1989 and 96.9% in 1990-96 when 
comparing the lower ten percentile of the hourly wage for those paid in non-output versus 
output-related pay systems. This indicates a slight increase in risk for receiving a lower pay 
when receiving pay based on output-related pay systems compared to the non-output 
related system. However, the likelihood of receiving a lower hourly pay compared to 
straight salary receivers is very low in the first place. 
 
In panel B, variable wage receivers still have a higher probability of receiving an hourly 
pay that exceeds the hourly pay for those receiving straight salary. Even though the share 
of employees receiving higher wages still favours the variable wage receivers, the 
percentage of variable wage receivers who do not earn lower have now shrunk to 71.7% in 
1983-89 and 68.8% in 1990-96.  
 
Based on the evidence in Table 4.9, one may argue that wages under output-related wage 
systems contain some amount of uncertainty. They often fall below the wages of straight 
salary workers in the same occupation. Similar evidence, analysing occupation-
establishment units, was found for Norway 1990 (Petersen & Snartland, 2004) and Finland 
in 1996 (Meyersson-Milgrom et al., 2002). However, the risk of receiving a lower hourly 
salary in the bottom ten percentiles is low. Only 2.4% of the variable wage receiver 
receives a lower wage. This indicates that when assuming risk, they are often rewarded by 
a higher hourly pay. 
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Table 4.9: Percent of workers on output-related payment systems 
for whom the wage is lower than the lowest 10 percentile and the 
average percentile of non-output related employees. 1983-1989 and 
1990-1996. 
Panel A: Bottom 10 percentiles Year Year 
 1983-1989 1990-1996 
Not Lower 97,6 96,9 
Lower 2,4 3,1 
Sum 100 100 
N (obs-years) 93 099 92 261 
   
Panel B: Average percentiles   
Not Lower 71,7 68,8 
Lower 28,3 31,2 
Sum 100 100 
N (obs-years) 93 099 92 261 
Note: only the recipients of variable wages are in the table. For 
each year (1983-1996), the number of recipients of variable wage 
has been sorted based on having higher (i.e. not lower) or lower 
than the ones receiving a straight salary. The results shown here 
is average for the period of 1983-89 and 1990-96. 
 
 
How large is the difference in hourly pay for female and male recipients of variable 
wage workers when comparing to straight salary? 
In Table 4.10, the effect of variable wages in comparison to the mean male wage when 
paid a straight salary is analysed. The analysis shows the development in wage for three 
levels (population, establishment and occupation) and in two periods: 1983-89 and 1990-
96. Separate analysis for each year was done, but is here presented as the average for the 
for the periods. The constant refers to average hourly male wage paid a straight salary. The 
table report the effect for males who earn variable wages (male, variable), the female ratio 
compared to males paid a straight salary (female) and the extra effect for females receiving 
a variable wage (female, variable). In order to estimate the difference between male and 
females who receive variable wages, the following calculations have been made (Female, 
variable: ratio of male variable).  
 
Variable wages for males 
There are no variations for male variable wages at the population level between the two 
periods compared to the straight salary employees. This indicates that the gain for 
receiving variable wages does not change between the 1983-89 and 1990-96 at the 
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population level. When examining the establishment and occupational level, the gains are 
increasing for males.  This means that there is a positive effect for males receiving variable 
wage compared to males receiving a straight salary. The variable wages for males are 
increasing over time when comparing to male recipients of straight salary. 
   
Comparing the ratio of male- and female variable wage 
As the evidence from Table 4.10 shows, the differences between male and female variable 
wages become smaller between the two periods. Furthermore, the differences decrease 
when moving from population to establishment level. When females are employed in the 
same occupation as males, there is only a 6% difference in 1983-1989 and 3% difference in 
1990 to 1996 in the hourly pay, indicating that even thought females in general receive a 
lower hourly variable wage than males, the differences diminishes when they are employed 
in the same establishment and when they are employed in the same occupation as males. 
This suggests that differences in hourly salary between men and female is connected to 
differences in the occupation in which individual is employed. 
 
Table 4.10: Hourly wages on 1) population, 2) establishment and 3) 
occupation level, for male variable wage receivers, and the female 
variable wage ratio of the male variable wage ratio of earnings. 
Exp(b) values reported. For two time periods, panel A (1983-1989) 
and panel B (1990-1996). Controlled for education, experience and 
experience squared. 
Note: (1) The female, variable ratio of male, variable is found by 
the following calculations: (female) + (female, variable). N=246 
196, N(obs-years)=954 838 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the effects of straight salary and variable wages has been analysed at 
different levels. Similarities and inequalities have been discovered. In Table 4.11 below, a 
Panel A (1983-1989) 1. Population 2. Establishment 3. Occupation 
Male, variable 0,11 0,03 0,07 
Female -0,13 -0,08 -0,05 
Female, variable -0,01 -0,02 -0,01 
Female, variable: ratio of male variable 1 -0,14 -0,10 -0,06 
Panel B (1990-1996)    
Male, variable 0,11 0,06 0,09 
Female -0,09 -0,07 -0,02 
Female, variable -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 
Female, variable: ratio of male variable 1 -0,11 -0,09 -0,03 
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brief summary of our hypothesis and results are given. In addition, possible biases for 
some of the estimations done in this thesis are mentioned. 
 
The bonus wage component is a significant proportion of the total remuneration for the 
variable wage receivers. However, it does not increase much at the population level for the 
periods in which these investigations were completed. An interesting observation is the 
decline in total monthly bonus payments as the number of recipient seem to rise. This 
might indicate that the total share of wages used for the purpose of the bonus component is 
increasing. 
 
There are large differences in gender distribution of wages, and in particular for the bonus 
wage component. While differences among gender are decreasing for straight salary and 
base wage, there are only small tendencies for decline in the bonus component. In other 
words, the gender pay gap in base wage plus a bonus is decreasing at a slower rate because 
of the continuous differences in the bonus pay component. 
 
I also find lower wages in retail compared to wholesale. Wage differences between trades 
decrease for straight salary recipients while it increases for variable wage recipients. This 
might be interpreted as changes to both political changes, organisational changes and 
changes in the competitive environment of the firm. 
 
The size of the firm is important when looking at wage differentials. Support for the 
assumption regarding the ability of large companies to pay higher wages compared to 
smaller firms was found. The significance of large companies’ ability to pay higher wages 
seems, however, to decrease when looking at the effect in two periods. In the later period, 
there seems to be less variation among small and large firms, indicating that smaller firms 
are better equipped for paying higher wages compared to earlier. 
 
Regional differences can also be seen as indicator for the organisational and competitive 
environment of the firm. When investigating the difference in hourly pay for variable wage 
and straight salary receivers within regions, and in the same occupation, there seems to be 
less significant differences among the hourly wages of the two pay systems. In Chapter 5, I 
will discuss some of our results from a more theoretical point of view and develop models 
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for describing the connection between our theoretical framework and the analysis 
performed in this chapter. 
 
 
Table 4.11: Summary of findings. Hypothesis 1-8.  
 Hypothesis Findings Possible bias & Comments 
H1 
Employees who receive a base 
wage plus bonus have higher 
hourly pay than employees on 
straight salary. 
Supported. Bonus receivers earn 
on average around 15 NOK more 
per hour (see table 4.1). 
Selection bias: Variable wages could 
be more common in jobs where pay is 
in general higher. 
H2 
How large is the difference 
between males and females 
receiving variable wages in the 
wholesale and retail trade? 
Gender distribution on wage 
system as share of the total: 
Wholesale: 9% males, 2% 
females. Retail: 3% males, 3% 
females (see table 3.1). 
Selection bias:  Wholesale is male 
dominated, compared to retail, this is 
also where most receive variable 
wages. When females are hired into 
the same occupations as males, 
differences in variable wage decline. 
H3 
Females receive a significantly 
lower base wage plus bonus than 
males. 
Supported. Females have on 
average lower base wage plus a 
bonus than to males. Females have 
in particular lower bonuses than 
males (see table 4.5). 
Selection bias in occupation. Females 
may not apply for certain occupations 
or employers may choose not to hire 
females into certain occupations. 
H4 
Recipients of variable wages are 
distributed differently in 
education than the recipients of 
straight salary. 
Partly falsified. Looking at three 
random years in the sample (1983, 
1990 and 1996) there were small 
differences between the two 
groups in terms of education (see 
table 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). 
Unclear connection between variable 
wage and education. 
H5 
The number of employees 
receiving variable wages 
increases over time. 
Some supported. Number of 
variable wage receivers varies 
each year. After 1993, the 
tendency is increasing number of 
variable wage receivers (see figure 
4.1). 
Possibility that economic 
conjunctures impact number of bonus 
receivers positively: People who have 
performance based contracts (but did 
not receive any bonus in bad times) 
start to receive bonus?  
H6 
Large firms pay higher variable 
wages than firms with few 
employees. 
Partly supported. In 1983-1989, 
firm size impact wage size 
negatively, i.e. smaller firm – 
lower wages. In 1990-1996 same 
trends occur, however the 
differences are declining (table 
4.7).  
Omitted variable bias. Significance of 
firm size decline over the time-period.
H7 
Employees receiving base wage 
plus bonus earn higher wages 
compared with those who 
receive straight salary when 
working in the same occupation, 
and in the same region. 
Not supported. No consistent 
results. In a few cases this 
hypothesis holds, but the 
difference between variable wage 
and straight salary are relatively 
low (see table 4.8). 
Omitted variable bias: The Eastern 
part of Norway is set as baseline 
category; this is also the most heavily 
populated region.  
H8 
Relative differences in the bonus 
component are equal among the 
variable wage receivers over 
time. 
 
Not supported. There is a shift in 
distribution. There is relatively 
less bonus in the higher receiver 
categories compared to the lower 
receiver categories (see table 4.3 
and 4.4). 
The ones receiving the highest 
bonuses seem to decrease the most 
when there are economic stagnations 
in the economy, as in 1986 
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5 Variable wage development and discussion 
In this chapter, I will discuss my research questions and look at these from the perspective 
of our theoretical framework (i.e. the Principal-Agent theory and financial flexibility). The 
research questions of this study were: 
 
1.”What is the effect of a bonus on wage levels?” 
2. “What are the individual characteristics of the recipients of bonus payments compared 
to non-bonus recipients?” 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, I discuss the relations of the Principal-Agent 
theory and try to cover some of the problems I found in Chapter 2 and see this in 
connection to the analyses from Chapter 4. I discuss some of the relevant issues based on a 
model outlining the macro-economic relations influencing Principal-Agent relationships. 
Secondly, I develop a model that describes the relationship between the Principal-Agent 
theory and financial flexibility, to see how these two theories might influence each other 
and may better describe bonuses as phenomena. 
 
5.1 Describing the use of bonus: Principal-Agent theory 
In Figure 5.1, factors influencing bonus in the wholesale and retail trade is outlined. The 
outcome of a situation in the Principal-Agent model can be said to be the baseline for 
bonus. Principal-Agent relationships arise based on how to share the profit from the 
outcome. It is in both the principal’s and the agent’s interest to make the “value” created in 
the outcome as large as possible in order to achieve higher profit. One way of increasing 
the outcome is by enhancing efficiency in order to create a larger volume. In terms of 
production, it may be in the principal’s best interest, to have a production volume as large 
as possible if the volume of production is tied to the revenue in the firm. For the agent, on 
the other hand, to receive a pay as high as possible based on putting in a minimum of effort 
can be more desirable. In this sense, both parties have their own preferences based on self-
interest. A problem then arises, the information problem. In order to align the agents’ 
preferences with the ones of the principal, the principal seek control over the information. 
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Economic performance is not only influenced by the firm, and the productivity within the 
firm. Also the general economic development in the country influence the level of bonus 
and thus also most likely the economic performance in the firm. Furthermore, the 
economic development is connected to regional differences as there is discrepancy in the 
regional wage levels (Barth & Dale-Olsen, 2003). 
 
Information is important for describing differences between the recipients of a bonus and 
the non-recipients. The bonus is thus connected to type of occupation and the ability to 
monitor the occupation efficiently in the Principal-Agent setting. One example of this is a 
relatively large difference between female and males. However, when investigating female 
and male recipients of bonuses employed in the same occupation, there are smaller gender 
differences than for the non-recipients. If the ability to monitor is difficult, one explanation 
for this can be due to asymmetrical information. One way of limiting the information 
asymmetry is by aligning the preferences of the agent more with the principal – and this 
may be motivated by a bonus. 
 
From the view of the information principle, one reason why there is a linear trend for the 
size of variable wages and size of firm might be caused by the monitoring effect, which is 
the need to monitor employees. As smaller firms becomes more capable of paying the 
same wages as large firm for straight salary over time, there is still a linear trend for the 
recipients of base wage and a bonus. From a theoretical point of view, one could expect 
that the ability to control employees becomes more difficult with more employees 
employed in a single firm. Thus, the need to motivate is greater and variable wages higher. 
Conversely, the differences in firm size could also be generated by a larger volume 
produced in firms with more employees. The volume produced by each employee is 
observable and the employee will thus receive bonus based on the fixed criteria’s agreed to 
in advance. The employee will therefore know how much to receive and how much to 
receive. Such criteria for bonus refer to individual or team based arrangements (Lunde & 
Grini, 2007), and can be said to have a lower level of uncertainty assuming the employee is 
able to perform based on the criteria of the agreement. Other criteria of bonuses are profit 
sharing (Lunde & Grini, 2007) and ownership structure in a firm (Langeland, 1995). The 
bonus payment received from profit sharing and ownership structure is not necessarily 
directly tied up to the performance of the individual, but to the performance of the firm. 
Under such circumstance, there is a greater risk of not receiving if the economic 
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performance within the firm is below the rates set in a year of a period. One could assume 
that in larger firms, more profit is generated. Hence, this would influence the level of 
bonus payments and variable wages under such conditions. The level of bonus can be said 
to be connected to the size of the firm, in particularly through ownership structures as 
larger firms are assumed to have better economy, and therefore higher ability to pay, when 
compared to small firms (Boye & Kinserdal, 1992). 
 
Another aspect of information is moral hazard. In the Principal-Agent relationship bonuses 
limits the problem of moral hazard, as bonuses is incentives to align their self-interest with 
the ones of the principal. From this point of view, straight salary does not provide 
incentives to overcome the problem of moral hazard. We might ask, can one limit the 
problem of moral hazard when paid a straight salary? This would presuppose that the 
agents have high morals, and we may assume that not all humans hold equally high moral 
standards: Morality is both hard to define and let alone measure. One must expect that 
some employees are inclined to exploit trust given them, rather than to honour it, however, 
this should not indicate that moral hazard necessarily is a larger problem when paid a 
straight salary as compared to a base wage plus a bonus. Akerlof (1982) finds that in 
occupations where employees tend to stay only a short while, their level of “production” is 
higher than for employees who stay in the same occupation over a longer period of time. 
Further, Akerlof (1982) describes the motivation as a gift exchange between the firm and 
the employee, as there are no incentives given in order to raise the productivity, other than 
the “normal” straight salary pay. In the wholesale and retail trade, this thesis finds that the 
average number of years an individual is occupied is four years. It is thus reason to believe 
that average individual observed in the wholesale and retail trade is only there for a limit 
time. Easterlin (2002) elaborate on how employees have higher performance based on 
happiness, without using financial incentives as the use of bonuses. The employee 
performs above the “average” level as the subjective feeling of happiness, based on 
achieving results in a job, is more important than financial incentives. Therefore, it must be 
said that bonus as incentive to overcome the problem of information, an in particularly 
moral hazard, is not sufficient. There can be many other reasons for why the employee 
behaves in a certain way. However, in many cases, the use of financial incentives as 
bonuses limits the problem of moral hazard in the principal-agent relationship. On the 
other side, it is also possible that the use of financial incentives may decrease the 
motivation of some employees. 
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In particular, individual based arrangements might weaken the employee ability to identify 
with co-workers and the firm. In contrast to the group setting, where employees are 
dependent on each other for reaching target rates, there will be less dependence on other 
employees when the bonus is based on individual performance. It is easy to relate to the 
importance of having helpful and trustworthy co-workers in order to help ease the 
everyday work life. Having helpful co-workers may also reduce stress and increase 
productivity of the employee, while a stressful environment might have the opposite effect.  
It is rational to assume that in a strong coemptive environment the relationship to co-
workers can be influenced differently than in an environment where individuals does not 
have to compete with each other21. However, problems in the contractual agreement (i.e. 
individual or team based, profit sharing or combined agreement) in the principal-agent 
model  is likely to be overcome by “designing” the contractual agreement in a manner that 
benefits both the principal and agent in the most appropriate way as the Vauxhall Motors 
Ltd example showed (Pearson, 1960). The terms, or contractual design, should therefore be 
carefully investigated in order to align the preferences of the agent with the principal, 
based on what is the desirable outcome of the principal-agent relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 In footnote 18, an example from an online discussion where a female employee was happier now when 
paid a straight salary than when paid a variable wage. 
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Figure 5.1: Factors leading to a high bonus in the wholesale and 
retail trade. Principal-Agent (P.A.) relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Principal-Agent relations and the connection to financial flexibility in firms 
In this section, I will look at the Principal-Agent theory and see how the theory can be seen 
in connection to financial flexibility in a broader perspective. In Figure 5.2 , the Principal-
Agent relations can be aggregated to affect the financial flexibility of the firm. The model 
consists of four parts: 1) firm financial flexibility; 2) size of bonus payments; 3) Principal-
Agent relations; and 4) factors influencing Principal-Agent relations.  
 
Firm financial flexibility 
Financial flexibility explains the effect of variable wages on an aggregated level. And as 
the model indicates, Principal-Agent relationships are just as dependent on firm financial 
flexibility as financial flexibility is dependent on Principal-Agent relationships. When the 
firm is able to have flexible expenses, the ability to restructure and make changes to the 
firms cash flow increases. The disposable firm wage flexibility again influences the 
Trade Firm size Region 
Large firm Wholesale 
Trade 
Economic 
Performance 
Information/
Self-interest 
P.A. 
relations 
Volume/ 
Quantity 
Different 
between 
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Principal-Agent relations as it defines much of the arena for creating target rates where a 
bonus is available to the employee. When looking at the purpose of the bonus payments, as 
showed in this model, I might raise the question, who does the flexibility in wages serve 
best? Is it in the interest of the firm, the employee or both the firm and employee? 
 
Financial flexibility for the firm can be crucial in order to met national and international 
competition and respond more quickly to changes in the product-market. By having 
variable wages, the aspect of competition can indeed be said to be met. If, under any 
circumstances, the economy became stagnant, which again might influence the firm’s 
income and expenses, variable wages can therefore be one of the first places a company 
might free some of the expenses. A firm can downsize the foundation for paying bonus to 
employees.  
 
The firm benefits from using bonuses by gaining more financial flexibility and the 
employee benefits from a bonus by a relatively high chance of receiving a higher wage 
than the straight salary receivers when comparing the same segment and their hourly pay. 
Productivity is believed to result in a better outcome for both the employer and employee 
than if there were no such incentives. If there were no benefits from having variable wages, 
it is not likely that there would have been an increase in number of firms offering variable 
wages and an increasing number of individuals receiving, as found in the case of the 
wholesale and retail trade.  
 
The size of bonus payments 
The size of bonus payments defines the variable part of the pay as bonuses are subject to 
large variations. The size of financial flexibility in the employees wage is defined in the 
Principal-Agent relations. As results show in Chapter Four, there are much larger 
variations within base wage plus bonus, and in particular the bonus component, than 
straight salary. The sum of bonuses refers to financial flexibility available based on bonus 
payments. When aggregating the sum of bonus payments (i.e. what consists of the total 
amount of variable expenses a firm use for bonuses) this is the foundation for firm 
financial flexibility. 
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Principal-Agent relationships 
Principal-Agent relations are set to explaining interaction at the micro level in the model. 
Here, agents are measured by criteria set by the principal in order to determine the hourly 
wage of the agent. There are various factors influencing the employer-employee 
relationship. In this thesis I found two theoretical aspects to be of interest in terms of what 
influence the decision making process of the employers: (1) the selection process or self-
selection (i.e. why are some employees in an occupation and others not?) and (2) national 
policies (how policies may influence the practice of employers). In addition, employers 
also have self-interest in influencing wage levels at a national level in order to ensure 
flexibility in wages (Bowman, 2002). However, while employers self-interest in 
influencing flexibility in wages and thus firms can be viewed as “internal” for the 
employers, the reason for why some individuals are attracted to some occupations and 
others not and the governmental policies, can be viewed as “external” to the employers. By 
“external” it is meant factors that can not be influenced by the employers alone. 
 
What the employee gain from the being paid on output related wage systems is the ability 
to increase the hourly wage higher than those paid a straight salary. However, in order to 
increase the hourly salary, the employee faces risk. In this thesis, I found the risk to receive 
a lower wage than those paid a straight salary to be low in both low-paid and average-paid 
segments of the population when paid in output related pay system. What the employee 
may gain when paid variable wages, can also be lost. Gains might be connected to risk, as 
there obviously always will be a higher gain when paid a higher variable wage than a 
straight salary below the level of variable wage. The risk might be higher for the employee 
as the risk of not receiving a bonus is present. One example of when an employee does not 
receive a bonus can be if the performance of the company is low in a certain period and 
therefore there is no profit to share. When paid a straight salary, the employee is entitled to 
the wage regardless of the company performance. From this view the risk of, for instance, 
faulty production is shifted from the firm to the employee.  
 
Prerequisites to the model 
The model’s second part forms the prerequisites for the model. The prerequisites to the 
model are the governmental framework for flexible structures, and can be viewed as factors 
influencing Principal-Agent relations. Policies, like the solidarity alternative, aimed at 
moderate wage growth which potentially would influence the employers’ ability to raise 
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employee wages to a certain level based on the employers’ preferences. This assumes that 
the employers’ preferences were not aligned with the intention of the solidarity alternative. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, both the differences between gender and the differences 
between trades has risen more when comparing individuals paid on output-related wage 
systems than individuals paid a straight salary. For straight salary, differences show 
decrease. From this point of view, a moderate wage policy has the intended effect in 
straight salary, but not in base wage plus a bonus. Thus, the moderate wage line may be 
one reason for why there was an increase in the number of employees paid on output 
related pay systems in particularly after 1992/93. 
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Figure 5.2: Bonus payments as the link between principal agent 
theory and firm financial flexibility. (I) Patterns of flexibility. 
(II) Prerequisites to the model. 
 
I. Pattern of flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Prerequisites for patterns of flexibility 
 
 
 
I have now elaborated on how the theory of the Principal-Agent model and firm financial 
flexibility can explain the relationship between employees and firm characteristics. A 
Policies 
Intention Actual effect 
Financial flexibility 
Firm: Advantage to have variable expenses. Economic variations in the market call for flexibility in the 
firms expenses. Wages are one of the largest expenses for a firm. Variations can be made in number of 
agents, but preferably in size of payments to the agent. 
 
 
 
 
Size of bonus payments 
Firm: The total size of bonus as a share of total 
wages makes out the variable part of the pay (i.e. 
grounds for financial flexibility) 
Principal: The sum of target rate payment, if 
agent fulfils 100% of criteria for receiving bonus. 
Agent: The bonus component as share of the 
hourly wage 
 
 
 
 
Principal-Agent relationship 
Principal: Determines target rates in the contractual relations (between principal and agent) prior 
to agent acceptance. 
Agent: Fulfil contract. Payment from target rate depend on quantity of workload, if the workload 
is measurable (i.e. number of units sold) 
  98
framework has been developed for describing the situation. In Chapter 6 conclusions will 
be drawn and some recommendations for further research will be made. 
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6 Conclusions and implications for further research 
Analysis finally makes clear to researchers what would have been most 
important to study, if they only had known beforehand  
(from Halcolm’s Laws of Evaluation Research; Patton, 1990:371). 
 
In this last chapter, I will first discuss how this thesis has contributed to a better 
understanding of variable wages. I will look at some implications for theory and practice. 
The implications for practice are mainly recommendations for policy development, and to 
some extent to business managers. At the end of this chapter, I will provide some 
suggestions for further research.  
 
6.1 Conclusions from theoretical framework 
This thesis has, among other things, demonstrated that variable wages changes the 
distribution of wages in the wholesale and retail trade. From analysing gender differences 
and differences between wholesale and retail it seems that straight salary used to be the pay 
system where differences was larger than in variable wages. However, the variable wage 
system took over the “role” of continuing differences between gender and in the wholesale 
and retail trade as policies where aimed towards a moderate system of wage growth. 
Policies regulating wage levels can thus be said to have the intended effect on straight 
salary, but not in terms of variable wages.  
 
This study has used the Principal-Agent model and the theory of flexible firms (financial 
flexibility) as key frameworks for analysing distribution and effect of variable wages. 
Here, I will first look at what I learned from using the theory of the Principal-Agent model 
and financial flexibility. Second, I will look at some aspects where the theories did not 
provide any deeper understanding.  
  
Conclusions 
There are strengths and weaknesses connected with the application of these frameworks to 
studying this phenomenon: the main strengths of the theory of the Principal-Agent model 
and financial flexibility are to understand the use of the bonus as a mean of reducing 
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financial risk and increasing financial flexibility in firms. In addition, the model can 
contribute to the explanation that achieving financial flexibility in wages can lead to a rise 
in the use of variable wages. Areas, in which theory gives a better understanding of the 
Principal-Agent framework when applied to this study, include providing reasoning behind 
the application of incentives and variable wage contracts and the shift of risk from 
company to employee. I can better understand the motivation of the principal use of the 
bonus in that the principal: 
 
Firstly, reduce financial risk by having flexibility in wages. Employers have the advantage 
of cutting wages rapidly if expenses run higher than the revenues. In the wholesale and 
retail trade, the average bonus measured as share of hourly wage is 10% for the employees 
in output related systems. Based on annual wage growth, the size of the bonus is a 
considerable financial adjustment factor for the employers. This means that the bonus is in 
fact quite effective to regulate the flow of money in firms. Secondly, reduce disadvantage 
of asymmetrical information by screening in which the contract is used to attract agents 
with the right ‘type’ of attitudes. When an agent is in an output-related pay system, the job 
has to be performed after the criteria that are set to reach target rates. If the agent fails, the 
pay will be reduced. Third, to reduce the cost of monitoring as agents is motivated to 
perform after the criteria set in the contract thereby avoiding moral hazard etc). Agents are 
monitored by their obligations to perform after the target rates. It is therefore less 
necessary to hire costly supervisors. Fourth, provide incentives that motivate employees to 
perform better. If the bonus arrangement is constructed adequately, the incentive created 
by the bonus may benefit both the principal and agent. Finally, based on self-interest, the 
agent performs better due to the higher pay received. When target rate is met, and the agent 
receives a bonus this can also send a signal to other employees. When other co-workers 
learn about the ability of the rewarded agent this is a social reward. 
 
What the models failed to explain 
I discovered a few aspects that these frameworks failed to explain or did not provide 
deeper understanding of, for example: 
 
Firstly, differences in base wage plus a bonus between genders: why women are less likely 
to be bonus receivers. Based on the Principal-Agent model, women then would be either a) 
more risk averse or b) less competent, neither of which I have strong reasons to believe. 
Secondly, why there are higher bonus gains in large firms compared to small. This can be 
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explained in part by financial flexibility and by the monitoring effect. However, I can look 
at theoretical and empirical work from innovation/entrepreneurship theories that have 
looked at how smaller, innovative firms must provide larger opportunities for long term 
gains (bonus, ownership and stock options). They must do this in order to recruit and 
maintain competent labour when they cannot compete with the larger firms in terms of 
offering a high fixed salary (see for example Barzel, 1995; March, 1991; March, 1994; 
Lambert & Larcker, 2004). From the findings in this thesis, small firms appear to have a 
lower financial flexibility compare to large. This may also be supported by that the retail 
trade is heavily dominated by four major corporations, as mentioned in the introduction. In 
addition, I found a consistent decline in number of establishments over the years, where 
there are fewer but larger establishments in the market. 
6.2 Implications for practice 
I provide some very limited implications for practice in terms of recommendations for 
policy makers and business managers. These are based on general tendencies found in the 
data on the use of variable wages. 
 
Implications for policy making 
Incentives proposing flexibility among employees and employers (firms) leads to 
innovations, creates revenues and values in both firm as well as society. It is important to 
consider whether policies create possibilities or limitations when considering how to add 
value to the company.  
 
The bonus is the one wage component that might be hard to control, in terms of equality, 
since the bonus provides a high level of local negotiations at the firm level. This means 
that the wage development may be harder to control by the use of governmental policies. 
As the outcome of the variable wage is not known in advance by the wage receiver, it is 
more difficult to negotiate terms in which equality and protection of the individuals is 
emphasised. Difficulties of organising employees in unions can also be seen as an effect of 
such pay formations. 
 
In several countries, the use of variable pay schemes seem integrated into policies. In this 
way, the policies protect some of the variable wage distribution. Guidelines need to be 
developed for information flow regarding firm bonus and bonuses in the chain of supply to 
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firms. One way of doing this might be to look at guidelines for how bonuses, in its various 
forms, are reported today. For instance, to report pay schemes (i.e. straight salary and 
variable wage) and not just the pay received. It is somewhat unclear what type of contract 
employees have. Are there groups of employees who are offered to work in an output-
related pay system but fails to meet the criteria where a bonus is granted? If so, this might 
influence pay levels. These examples clearly show there is a lack of guidelines for how to 
address correctly the issue of distribution and information between the parties in the labour 
market. 
 
Implications for business managers 
I can sum up some of the different aspects of the bonus system that are worth considering 
for business managers. The information discovered from this thesis can be viewed as 
suggestions on which aspects to consider when developing future variable payment 
schemes. I will here present some strengths and weaknesses of using bonus. Some of these 
are general recommendations and some are direct implications from the research in this 
thesis. 
 
Strengths 
One strength of the bonus is that the wage formation is provides a higher flexibility within 
the firm. Second, bonuses may make production more efficient. Third, variable wage 
systems may lower the cost of wage negotiations, as the employee is able to influence his 
wage. Fourth, the bonus can be viewed as a way to control and therefore reduce the cost of 
monitoring. Fifth, the subjective sense of employee happiness may rise as a bonus is 
received. A bonus might give a social reward as co-workers see that the firm values the 
employee skills. Sixth, the bonus may motivate workers to perform the job according to the 
criteria of the employee, and reduce employer cost of hiring as employees, with desirable 
characteristics for the occupation in question, might be attracted by the variable pay 
formation. Finally, if used correctly, the bonus may be a powerful tool for creating high 
economic value within the firm as it provides the right incentives for improving and 
making value creation and production more efficient. 
 
Weaknesses 
The employees will probably prioritise tasks according to what is defined for reaching the 
target rate of production. This may suggest that focus is taken away from other important 
  103
areas of work. One such example is helping co-workers. Second, if employees receive 
bonus over a longer period of time, and the bonus suddenly is taken away due to for 
instance, expense cut in the firm – employees might be dissatisfied as they could have 
started to rely on bonus as fixed income. Third, bonus can be used as an incentive to get 
hired in the first place. And the higher the incentive is - the better foundation for recruiting 
the more desirable employees and motivating people who might be eligible for the job but 
who would not apply for certain occupations for various reasons. As several firms apply 
this strategy, the level of bonus might increase for each employee. Resulting in canalising a 
lower share of the income, by distributing more bonuses to the employee from the firm. 
Fifth, it is argued by some that bonus works against its purpose. A high bonus is given 
when times are good and company revenue high. Bonus is not given in times when 
company profit is low. Thus bonus does not motivate to create higher values in times of 
recession. Therefore bonus can, under some circumstances, have the opposite effect when 
it is needed the most. Finally, bonus may ruin or reduce firm value if used wrongly22, as 
large and unexpected bonus payment from employers to employees may result in levels of 
firm assets below what originally was planned, and may decrease shareholder value. 
 
6.3 Implications for further research  
Towards the end of this thesis, some aspects that should be regarded as important pointers 
for further research is provided: 
 
Compare across industries 
Study other segment in the labour market using panel data and compare with the trade 
studied in this thesis. Other areas, in particularly in the private sector are useful for 
comparison analysis, as differences between output related pay systems and straight salary 
are likely to be larger than in the public sector. It should be regarded as important to map 
how variable wags is used throughout the economy and the development trends for the 
case of Norway.  
  
 
                                                 
22 On January 28th, 2008, Norway’s biggest media group of concerns Schibsted saw their stock value drop by 
11.3%. One of the resons for this was large unexpected bonus payments Schibsted had to make in some of 
the companies they own (Dagens Næringsliv, Feb 28th, p. 54). 
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How can bonus be used in recruitment? 
Another important aspect can be to look at how bonus can be used for the recruitment of 
employees, in particular the recruitment of women. As indicated in this paper, stereotypic 
perception of male and female; good and bad wage negotiators are connected to a 
stereotypic perception. For the case of these data, occupational categories are connected 
with bonus. And one possible explanation for why there are fewer females in the 
occupational group might be because it is less desirable for females to work her. In other 
words, one possibility for decreasing gender wage inequality can be to offer better 
incentives for integrating females into certain occupations.  
 
Bonus and firm performance 
Compare statistics on bonus with firm financial data to see whether firms that perform 
better are the ones that pay out the highest total bonuses. Theoretically, using incentives 
such as bonus should increase the firm output in terms of total revenue to the firm. There 
seem however, to be lacking evidence on the connection between using economical 
incentives and how incentives lead to an increase in firm revenue. 
 
In order to have full information regarding establishments and their income profile, one 
could use the same data as used in this thesis, but in addition have information regarding 
the revenues for each firm. It would then be possible to address how the use of bonuses are 
connected to the performance of the firm. Similar studies have been investigated in terms 
of bonuses given to leaders and firm performance in Norway (see Lismoen, 2006 & 
Lismoen, 2007). 
 
Bonus and the innovation process in firms 
As variable wages seem to have different purposes in small firms than large firms, case 
study of how economical incentives are used between various sizes of firms. One aspect of 
this, could be to address the innovative processes, as such processes are the foundation of 
firm growth and expansion. Central question could then be; does bonuses influence 
creative and innovative processes within the firm? Are entrepreneurial types more prone to 
desire such contracts that are high risk (as a form of gambling)? How is variable wages 
linked with innovation and risk sharing? 
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Gender and bonus  
Differences between genders were not the focus of this thesis, and have thus only provided 
limit information on the subject. However, when discovering characteristics of the 
recipients of bonus, females are much less prone to receive a high bonus than males. Based 
on gender theory, one should continue exploring what might lead females to desire variable 
wage less, or why females in general receives lower bonuses than males. 
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